GLOBAL PRAYERS
Contemporary Manifestations of the Religious in the City

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In this essay, I intend to offer an explanation for the phenomenon of the return of the religious in the world’s urban centers. My aim here is to overcome a perspective which primarily views this phenomenon as a defensive strategy protecting traditional ways of life which provide a home for those who have lost out in modernization processes. Instead, I shall argue that this phenomenon represents an initially excluded group’s proactive—and often extremely successful—appropriation of a particular lifeworld determined by neoliberal laws. I shall also seek to show that the project has its own intellectual dignity, which one need not share as secular social scientists (and I would include myself among them)—yet one whose logic can nonetheless be appreciated. In that sense, this attempt to understand a viewpoint I do not share is, at the same time, a plea for a post-secular perspective that retains the right of (religious as well as secular) life designs to be respected, without appropriating them.

**THE RETURN OF THE RELIGIOUS**

The return of the religious in late modernity, already described numerous times (see for example Kepe1 1991; Graf 2014), provided the starting point for the *Global Prayers* project. This led to three observations determining the project’s focus.

First: the return of the religious is an *urban* phenomenon. It has occurred most obviously and extensively from the 1970s in Third World megacities, but is also evident in other large cities. This is a surprising development since well into the 1970s large cities in particular were regarded as citadels of secular culture.

Second: this is a phenomenon found across religions—though for political reasons, at least over the recent years, far too little attention has been given to this fact. After 9/11, the emphasis was on the particular nature of Islam, and similarities with Christian and Jewish movements became minimalized. Islam and Islamism were stylized as the ultimate “Other”—and that excluded any comparison. Here, the aim is to re-forge a link with research from the 1980s and ’90s, yet at the same time transcend it. In those days, common features were
subsumed under the notion of "fundamentalism," which set a clear framework for interpretation: this was anti-modernism, usually supported by the losers in modernization processes (for a summary of this view, see Marty and Appleby 1996; Castells 1997). Here, the characteristic theories for the time were, for example, Riesebrodt’s claim (1996) that fundamentalist movements were patriarchal protests by men unable to cope with modernization processes, a notion now completely outdated, or Castells’ definition (1997) of fundamentalisms as identities for resistance—in other words, encapsulating defensive movements in contrast to those project identities taking up the challenges of network societies in a proactive and emancipatory manner. Among other things, the Global Prayers project started from the belief that it was necessary to overcome this restricted perspective, laden with numerous contradictions, and shed new light on the commonalities. For example, it was clear that (contradicting Riesebrodt) the new movements were mainly supported by women, tended to have the character of proactive project identities (contradicting Castells) and, at least since the 2000s, have included many adherents who are winners in the modernization processes.

The third noticeable point was that this religious renewal was not supported precisely by mainstream religious communities. Instead, they tended to be surprised and overtaken by this development. The key supporters of this new religious consciousness were, rather, previously more marginal and non-conformist religious actors (joined by some new groups): Evangelicals, Pentecostals, Islamists and post-Islamists. Remarkably, despite their differences, these groups share more similarities with each other than with the established groups of their respective religions—even in terms of their forms of religious expression and its public performance. This similarity remained unnoticed in research into fundamentalism in the 1990s, since this focused on the stated objective of the religious communities to return to the fundamentals—and so overlooked possible major parallels resulting from the shared critique of the conditions of late modernity.

In brief, since the 1970s, we have observed a dual power shift in nearly all the world’s megacities, namely between the secular and sacred and between mainstream and non-conformist religiosity. Quite in the spirit of Weber’s sociology of religion, the key to this shift can be found by examining the social carriers of this new religiosity, namely, the new urban residents flooding into the cities during the phase of explosive urban growth in the 1980s and ‘90s.

SOCIAL CARRIERS: THE NEW URBAN MIGRANTS

The explosive urban growth in cities occurred after the epochal break initiated by the so-called oil crisis in 1973. According to Manuel Castells (1996), who I follow here, this economic crisis marked the end of the postwar boom and triggered a global restructuring of the capitalist mode of production. This restructuring can be characterized as increasing production by radicalizing market mechanisms and transferring this to numerous other fields which, as in the sphere of the state’s actions in particular, had previously compiled with a different, uncontested logic. In this context, two factors primarily led to urban growth.

First, protecting national markets by tariff barriers fell victim to the deregulation of the financial and goods markets. Key industries previously placed under state protection for reasons of national security (as a rule, heavy manufacturing and energy) were opened up to competition—and this applied equally to those traditional businesses and agricultural enterprises which had survived until then in the shadow of the state's protectionist policies. The markets were flooded with products from the Global North, and later from new global players, especially from South East and East Asia. This reorganization of the global economy brought a significant displacement of labor in its wake. Moreover, the 1973 crisis showed that the classic state tasks had reached the limits of fundability. While in the Global North, this was primarily seen in terms of financing the social state, the Global South related it first and foremost to the state’s responsibility to budget for economic development. State-owned companies, often structured by political considerations (i.e., nationwide development plans), were privatized. The public-sector logic associating rationality with equality was replaced by a market logic equating rationality with efficiency. The free play of market forces took the place of state-development policies intended to ensure progress for a country in its entirety. Together with the movement of migrants through labor displacement in rural areas, this led to the unchecked growth of metropolises, with the creation of such megacities as Istanbul, Lagos, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, Mumbai—all cities with populations growing many times over in the 1980s and ‘90s. Istanbul expanded from 2.1 million in 1970 to 13.1 million in 2010; Lagos from 1.2 million in 1971 to 8 million in 2006; and Rio de Janeiro from 4.5 million in 1970 to at least 11.7 million in 2007. With the influx from the countryside, urban culture changed, resulting in a push to sacralization. Here, Istanbul can be taken as a particularly clear example. Until the 1970s, in common with all large Turkish cities, Istanbul was a bastion of Kemalist culture. This did not mean religion had disappeared—rather that the lay-culture had firmly assigned it a place in private life. Public culture was secular. While the large city was associated with the project of nation, modernity, and progress, the lowlands were regarded as Islamic, pre-modern, and reactionary. In an acculturation process, urban migrants adopted the secular culture within one generation (Karpov 1976; Schifflauer 2010); urban and cosmopolitan were simply synonyms. The 1970s saw the first appearance of neo-religious movements in a secular environment when, as part of the student protest movement, Muslim students organized themselves into independent groups separate from those supporting a nationalist or communist agenda. After the state of emergency was lifted, the movement of female students wearing headscarves marked a new Islamist presence. In contrast to the students’ political movement, the objective here was a transformation of civil society, the conquest of the modern city—in brief, a reshaping of urban culture (Göle 1995). This aim was supported by the flowering of social movement in the geceliknas. Raising the social question, in particular, was a new element both in Islamist and Islamic culture as a whole. It was these activities in the geceliknas that resulted in the rise of the Milli Görüş movement in the 1980s.
1990s and 2000s. It is no coincidence that the new generation of neo-Islamic politicians initially became mayors of urban districts before they took over the national government. How can this change be explained? What is the reason for the fading appeal of secular culture? In contrast to earlier waves of urban migrants, why did the new migrants in the 1990s and 2000s become religious? One explanation frequently advanced is that they did not become religious but simply remained religious, bringing their beliefs into the city. Given the vast number of new migrants, it was no longer possible to integrate them into secular culture. However, this explanation is too mechanical. Above all, it does not address the fact that the nature of urban prayers differed totally from religion in rural areas. Rather, the new religious providers formulated a set of beliefs that integrated and reflected the existential situation of the new urban classes. So what was different about these new migrants?

To start with, we need to note that post-1973 migration was triggered by many more push factors than the pull factors characterizing earlier waves of labor migration (Massey 1998: 14). By and large, the booming postwar economy was dominated by a shortage of labor. In the international arena, this shortage had led to recruitment agreements such as, for instance, the agreement between West Germany and Turkey. But urban migrants could also reckon on finding a job relatively quickly in their domestic market as well. In brief, both the national and international migrants moved into labor economies. They occupied the lowest position in the regular job market, hence facilitating the social advancement of earlier migrants. The dirtiest and most dangerous jobs were passed on to the new migrants. Yet although they were the lowest of the low, they were still integrated into the system—and the classic labor organizations, such as unions and political parties, also took up their interests. And even if they could not imagine a better future for themselves, they could imagine it for their children. In contrast, since the 1973 economic crisis, push factors have dominated. Many more people lost their jobs in rural areas than could be integrated into the economic system. In the rapidly growing megacities, rural migrants initially found somewhere to stay in the slums, bidonvilles, favelas or gevekondular. In contrast to the previous waves of migrants, urban migrants now found work on the informal labor market with its characteristic precarious employment relations. In this volume, AbdouMaliq Simone has impressively described just what this meant for the situation in Third World megacities (above all, for young people).

He describes the situation of a liminal economy—an economy not integrated into the regular labor market, yet, at the same time, dependent on it. It is an erratic, unpredictable space where new possibilities are always being created, but these can neither be anticipated nor systematically planned. The dominant form of action in such spaces is short-term and tactical, rather than strategic (de Certeau 1988), the art of bricolage, making do with whatever comes to hand, rather than the art of the systematic engineer (in contrast, see Levi-Strauss 1968), the figure so epitomizing modernism.

Migration in the cities of the Global North underwent an analogous structural change. Admittedly, though, the regular economy continued to dominate here—while in the Global South, the informal economy was prevalent from the 1980s to the 2000s. To begin with, a large proportion of the migrants recruited in the 1960s and ’70s were dismissed, and became jobless—which increasingly led them to be viewed as a burden on the social system (Massey and Arango 1998). In addition, through a recruitment stop, the economies of the North protected themselves from the consequences of the neoliberal restructuring (from which they significantly profited). Legal migration was only allowed in cases of marriage, family reunification, or for reasons granting refugee status. For this reason, even in the North, immigration was primarily migration into a precarious labor market. As elaborated in the segmented labor market theory, this secondary labor market played a considerable role in some sections of the economy (agriculture, construction, cleaning, etc.). In contrast to the capital-intensive primary labor market with its highly qualified workers who need to be retained as they are not easy to replace, the secondary labor market is dominated by unstable and less skilled jobs. These are often taken by new immigrants prepared to work for exploitative wages (also due, above all, to the international discrepancy of the earnings gap). According to Piore (1979), this results in an interdependency between the readiness of new groups of migrants to work in this low-status, low-wage sector and, at the same time, the segment being kept alive by new migrant groups (and the low-status groups have a low status precisely because they are occupied by migrant workers).

In particular thanks to this split labor market, the economies of the North still had definite pull factors even in the economic crisis. However, the new labor from the South was primarily absorbed in the secondary space of a liminal economy—the “shadow” economy. In this context, the growth of border controls across Europe under the Schengen Agreement and in the United States with the border fence project between the United States and Mexico had an oddly regulatory function. Migration was not prevented, just made significantly more difficult. The border remained porous (Tsianos and Hess 2009). Its function was far less about prevention and far more about delaying illegal entry, and making it more costly and dangerous. This led to a functionality described by Massey as follows:

“...In some way the state of affairs is highly functional and even adoptive: labor demand is met by undocumented migrants, 'temporary' workers, and...”

3 The Milli Giriş (National Vision) movement was founded in the late sixties in Turkey by Seyyidettin Erbakan. While it was basically a movement of provincial notables during the seventies it re-invented itself after the state of exception (1971). It adopted a social gospel and started to mobilize in the major cities. The growing tension between “reforers” and “traditionalists” lead to a break-up of the movement in 1980 between the followers of Erbakan and those of İşbank.

4 All referring to a black or slumtown: in francophone countries bidonvilles ("village"); favelas in Brazil (from Portuguese); and in Turkey gevekondular ("house put up quickly").

5 Here, too, see Felix Hoffman's analysis of the situation in Albania (2004). Until the 1998 economic crisis, the region lived from illegal migration. The low wages created a competitive advantage.
legal immigrants able to overcome the barriers, keeping employers happy:
yet the government is not perceived as encouraging or promoting immi-
grant thus avoiding a political backlash." (Massey and Arango 1998: 14)

In other words, a split labor market with its own low-wage sector ensures that illegal im-
migrants can reckon with a considerable chance of finding work (primarily in agriculture
and construction, as well as the domestic-help segment). Conversely, a porous border sup-
ports the continued existence of a low-wage sector. Legal marginalization in particular
facilitates extremely exploitative working conditions. Structurally, the world of illegal im-
migrants that Felix Hoffmann (2010) described in Almeria is similar to Simone’s descrip-
tion of the urban centers in the South. This is a world in which tactical action is central.
Hoffmann describes the longing—initially linked to the desire to get a passport—as a long-
ing for a fixed location as a basis to first enable the possibility of strategic planned action.
To summarize: while labor migrants in the postwar period faced exploitation, migrants
since the 1970s see themselves first and foremost as facing exclusion. When radical global
changes led to job losses in rural economies, these unemployed workers then found in-
creasingly borders and barriers cutting them off from both national and international pri-
mary labor markets. Admittedly, it should be noted that the binary structure suggested
by exclusion theorists—with an included, welcomed population on the one hand, and an
excluded, superfluous population on the other—is unsustainable as it stands. Instead, the
border from inside and outside produces a number of nuances and overlaps. The side of
the included also covers those groups in the condition of precarious who are threatened by
exclusion; the side of the excluded also comprises those who have acquired rights to so-
cial welfare and are still receiving benefits, and who are in a fundamentally different po-
tion from those with no rights to welfare payments. However, it should be noted that
the difference between inside and outside which is, in many respects, more important,
overlaps the top and bottom distinction. In many diverse areas, new migrants see them-
Themselves facing borders blocking their access to equal chances and equitable opportunities
to prove their abilities.

It is crucial to understand that, for the Global South, the legitimacy of such boundar-
ies (almost unquestioned in the Global North) is more than doubtful. First, there is a
distinct feeling of the asynchrony of opening borders for financial and goods markets
under the banner of deregulation, with all the far-reaching consequences this has for
livelihoods, and at the same time largely sealing borders to those who bore the brunt of
those consequences. Here, it undoubtedly also plays a role that the drawing of borders
was tangible in a new way, particularly in view of the cross-border mediascapes and
ideoscapes (Appadurai 1991) (one could add consumescapes as well) etc. developing with
globalization. The closer the world moved together, the more intensely the barriers and
constraints on personal mobility were felt. The North was increasingly seen as tightening
its borders to defend a prosperity acquired at the cost of the South.

4 See also Hayman's analysis of the way the United States border police operate (1995), as well as Kearney's (2004).

THE COLLAPSE OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

The above, then, summarizes the material background to the return of the religious. Its so-
cial carriers were the new urban masses, excluded from the regular primary economy and
dependent on a precarious labor market. It is, though, of crucial importance that parallel to
this development, neoliberalism also introduced a Wende (turning point) in the history of
thought naturalizing an opening to the religious. With this turnabout, the belief in progress
collapsed which underlay the intra-societal hope of salvation—as did the hope of a political
solution to the problems.

In retrospect, the 1950s and ’60s appear characterized by what today seems to be an almost
unbelievable faith in progress, with progress understood empathetically as overcoming
hunger, poverty, and hardship and, in positive terms, as creating equality, liberty, and prosperity.
The development of nuclear power promised clean energy for all; the green revolution prom-
ised to eradicate hunger; economic growth promised prosperity for all. Decolonization was
linked to the expectation that the countries of the Global South would be on a par with the
Global North within a decade (!). This belief in progress had a capitalist and a socialist variant.
While the former saw prosperity for all as built on the prerequisite of developing productive
forces, the latter viewed it as the outcome of equality and justice. In this postwar period, for
the first time, fulfilling the dream of a secular modernity appeared to be within reach.

With the 1973 crisis, this dream evaporated. This did not exclude the possibility of econom-
ic growth—even increased growth—but hardly anyone still believed that it would lead to a
movement for global equality. The path followed by nuclear power and the green revolution,
both of which were connected with incontestable risks, could also be traced for all other inno-
vations. There was a feeling of facing a rapidly accelerating pace of life with an epochal break
in living conditions—but the teleological illusion had vanished. One no longer knew wheth-
er new developments would have a positive or negative effect (or, more precisely, whether
another catastrophe was looming behind the initial euphoria). The concept of a “world risk
society” (Beck 1986) describes this overall state of consciousness: the entirety, the universe,
the world, is no longer seen in terms of assurance and trust, but in terms of angst.

With the collapse of the paradigm of progress, the Archimedean point needed to exert the
force to shape politics is lost. If a belief in the future is no longer sustainable, this also nulli-
fies the perspective endowing socialist and communist movements with meaning. For this
reason, neoliberalism also meant the collapse of the political sphere (at least in the sense of
a comprehensive solution). Today (particularly given the present economic crisis), it seems
illusive, even completely counterproductive, to want to combat the markets to create more
equality, equitability, or humanity.

This situation offers providers of religion per se with a particular opportunity. When the
inner-worldly situation no longer provides a perspective, offers of meaning that inherently
assume the invalidity of all inner-worldly redemption are especially attractive. Religion
introduces the incommensurable and heterogeneous. The religious promises of salvation
shift the point from which you can gain a perspective on life onto the transcendental level.
In principle, they allow the idea of the miraculous—and, in doing so seem to gain a particu-
lar plausibility in those situations in life where planning and prediction cease to apply. "By
the miraculous I mean the ability of urban residents to act without being eligible to act—
where something is put in motion, put in place regardless of whether individuals have any recognizable capacity to do this..." (Simone 2013: 3). They relativize the laws of the world through adherence to divine laws—or, in a manner similar to Saint Paul, even replace the old law by the new. Ultimately, a valorization of life counts its devaluation, which is an inherent characteristic of exclusion. A person’s real value is revealed in the relationship to the transcendent. The experience of inner-worldly devaluation is relativized, and so becomes bearable. This point cannot be emphasized enough: it is simply nonsense to criticize providers of religion for a lack of class-consciousness when the basis for a meaningful Marxist class analysis is not given.

COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN THE GLOBAL PRAYERS COMMUNITIES

The individual revivalist or reawakening movements are inscribed in different traditions—both in Islam and Christianity. Aside from the differences from adherence to the one or other major tradition, it is significant whether the emphasis is placed more on writings (as in Evangelicalism or in Islamic groups which emphasize the guidance by divine law) or on a spiritual access to the divine, as in Pentecostalism or in neo-mystical Islamic groups (such as the Gülen community or the supporters of Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan). Nonetheless, the parallels between such groups predominate, as will be shown in the following. These parallels are due to the specific religious approach developed for these groups which is systematically different from mainstream religions. This approach can be divided into four main points: a promise of salvation; asceticism and personal responsibility; communitarianism; and missionizing.

The promise of salvation can be paraphrased in the words of Jimmy Cliff’s classic song as: “You can get it if you really pray; but you must pray, pray and pray, you succeed at last.” The names of evangelical churches photographed by David Spero (2007) stand as exemplary for the promised salvation: “Unstoppable believers. The gateway to your destiny,” “World Mission Agency—Winners’ Chapel,” “Christian Gospel World Outreach Evangelistic Ministries. Unstoppable Achievers,” “Building overcomers for tomorrow.” These slogans, intended to attract people to join the congregation, are expressed in the language of neoliberal mobilization and motivational campaigns, which themselves are informed by a metaphor of the world as a competitive arena. There is a method in this fusing of the secular and sacred. One becomes a “winner” in and through joining a religious community—evidently to start with only in relation to the next world, but in this world as well, through the development of a feeling of personal dignity and worth. The promises of salvation are each adapted to specific situations: Erbakan promised Turkish migrants, who were stranded in Europe and stuck in a hopeless situation, a radiant heavencoming to an Islamicized Turkey (Schiffauer 2010). Conversely, the promise of salvation for residents of Lagos, who see borders as preventing them from enjoying a meaningful and dignified life, comes in the form of migration—and hence access to a world where you can prove your value. In this context, the complaint of an International Organization for Migration (IOM) manager is striking. In accordance with European Union policy, he tries to stop young men from attempting to en-

1 The mingling of religious and economic codes seems to be characteristic for the communities of “global prayers”. See also Schiffauer (2010: 150–7).
9 Here and throughout global prayers in lower case is referring specifically to the phenomenon of religiosity in urban spaces in the contexts of the current discussion and not directly to the title of the project and the current volume.
One only needs to substitute "new life" for "reborn" and jihad for the permanent "spiritual war against evil" and you have the program of a nonconformist Islamic community. It is no coincidence that the global prayers program of whichever provenance has a structure strongly resembling a family. Especially in those situations of relative anonymity experienced everywhere by newly arrived migrants, the family—and in particular the nuclear family—acquires an immense value as a mutually supporting community. Who can one rely on in times of anonymity, if not the family? Across the global prayers communities, this valorization of the family is linked to a very conservative sexual morality (Schiffauer 2010: 49, 50).

Third, a vibrant community life plays a key role in stabilizing the self-governance of personal conduct. All the global prayers communities have strong communautarian features. Across the communities, the believers emphasize the stability and strength which the community gives them. Without the community, they would never have managed to free themselves from their involvement in criminality, drugs, the youth scene, alcohol, or prostitution. It is crucially important to note here that the communities have been created from below, founded and supported by laypeople. As a rule, groups of traditionally linked fellow countrymen and women formed the cloud seeds of the communities in the Islamic sphere—in this case, in the poor urban quarters and in migration—and they were then joined by others; in contrast, the charismatic vocation of lay-preachers appears to play the main role in Pentecostal churches (see, for instance, Lanz 2012). Nonetheless, a remarkable similarity is shown in all these movements in their emphasis on the ministry—in Christian congregations as well as in Islamic communities.11 The personal charisma of the preacher and a vibrant community life was more important than any theological training. In this way, global prayers blur the distinction between the priesthood and congregation: every individual is called and accountable. Salvation is regarded as each individual's autonomous task and is not left to an administrative body.

These forms of autonomously organized lay-religiosities produce a type of religiousness paving the way for the acceptance, as it were, of an undisguised and unbridled pleasure in the sacred (as can be understood through Rudolph Otto's (1963) aesthetic approach to the holy), and this is found both in the moment of the awe-inspiring, the overwhelming, overpowering, and the mysterious, as well as in the gentle and uplifting (though different communities set different emphases). The result is a desublimation of religious practices, where religious energy is often discharged with an unrestrained force that not only leaves the secular middle classes speechless at this "outburst springing from desperation and borne by untamed enthusiasm" (Bourdieu 2010: 105). From the perspective of tempered middle-class religiosity, this pleasure makes migrant religion often seem kitschy and excessive. It is not least this specific aesthetic of religiosity which leads mainstream religious communities to reject such movements.12

Incidentally, this specific religiosity has also led to the aesthetic emerging first and foremost in North American evangelical and Pentecostal communities becoming nothing short of the signature style across communities and religions. In fact, the illustrated writings enabling Harun Yahya to reach an audience of millions in Turkey appear to directly emulate North American publications in the same style.

These self-organized communities created in the new migrant districts met in storefront churches and backyard mosques. Their religious character gave them an extra-territorial feel. This may well have been most obvious in the favelas, dominated by drug-related crime, where they occupied spaces respected both by criminals and the police. Here, they formed a quite manifest "third space." Even if their point of origin was religious, the communities never served solely religious purposes. Instead, within the framework of the communities, it went without saying that they also provided mutual help and support. This was most needed in those migrant districts in the South where hopelessly overwhelmed state institutions had entirely lost traction. "These new migrants, who never questioned their links to Islam even if they were not necessarily devout, could be reached via a language combining sociopolitical problems with a religious perspective. One key here was the Islamic vision of an equitable society" (Schiffauer 2010: 85).

Jenny White also regards this as the starting point for the growth of the Islamic movement.13

"I use the term Islamism movement to mean a general mobilization of people around cultural, political and social issues that are presented and interpreted through an Islamic idiom. ... What binds people together in the Islamism movement is neither ideology (it is political or religious) nor any particular type of organization. ... Rather the movement is rooted in local culture and interpersonal relations, while also drawing on a variety of civic and political organizations and ideologies." (White 2002: 6)

Teschner has described the Christian communities in Africa in a very similar way.

"Over the last ten years, many social networks have become established in the rapidly growing informal settlements in large African cities. Initially, these networks fought for improvements in living conditions in their settlements, calling for state aid programs and organizing self-help measures. At

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11 On this point, one finds the idea in Islam of every individual having a responsibility to preach their beliefs (see, for instance, the account of Cemalodies's Kapus's teachings (Schiffauer 2000: 493f.) in the universality of the priesthood in the Pentecostal churches: Serçan (2011: 433) and among the Evengelicals. Pally (2003).

12 "This, though, is nothing new. Martin Breshears has left us a wonderful description of the atmosphere in the 1950s among the circle of Jewish immigrants in a neighborhood in Berlin's Lehrterstrasse district. The communal prayer service became increasingly erotic, emotional and noisy. Suddenly, just when it seemed that everyone was so exhausted they would have to pause, two men stood up, raised on the tips of their toes, cried out with their hands lifted and burst out in song as if this were the moment when, through this shared sermonizing, the

soul would fly directly out of the body through the ceiling to the heavens" (Breshears 1982: 42). H. Richard Niebuhr refers to the conversion to Methodist practices among the well-to-do English middle classes in the nineteenth century: "To an ordinary cultivated mind, there was something extremely repulsive in the Methodist teacher's tears and prayers and amorous ejaculations, in the coarse anthropomorphism and the overweening dogmatism with which he dealt with the most sacred subjects. In the narrowing of his theory of life and his utter insensibility to many of the influences that expand and embolden it, in the mingled modesty and self-confidence with which he imagined that the whole course of nature was altered for his convenience. But the very qualities that impressed his influence on one sphere enhanced it in another. His impassioned prayers and exhortations stirred the hearts of multitudes whose way was monotonous teaching had led absolutely elsewhere. The supernatural atmosphere of miracles, judgments and inspirations in which he moved invested the most prosaic life with a halo of romance." (Niebuhr 1948: 82-3).

13 This only seemingly contradicts. Saif al-Saiful (1999) argued that the poor and new urban residents were not supporting Islamism. However, given their situation, they turned towards less destabilized prayers. Apparently, though, Saif al-Saiful was concerned with Islamist organizations in a narrower sense—and not the socio-religious movement in its own particular standard forms widespread among the new urban classes.
In this process, the religious communities become “migrant institutions” (Goss and Lindquist 1995) as well, also taking up and responding to the specific problems of the migrants in quite practical terms providing, for example, contact persons, centers to meet in the new surroundings, and a source of information on places to live and available workshops (Heck 2010). In this context, it is precisely one of the strengths of these communities that they are not a class-specific organization as was the case among the classic left-wing groups, but an expression of a cross-class religious milieu (which, conversely, they also play a part in constructing). This becomes especially important in the later phase when the self-disciplining program takes effect, facilitating social upward mobility for at least some community members. Naturally, access to people who are well-off also increases the value of the network. Admittedly, this sounds as though social organization is the essential aspect and religion, only, as it were, the idiom. In my view, this is not correct. Instead, one must assume a reciprocal interlacing, with religious ideas inscribed into urban self-organization (Dussel 2011 in relation to Catholicism), and, conversely, social issues inscribed in religion. Just as the support structures developing within the community framework were constituted through religion, so religion was also transformed and changed by its social commitment. While in small towns and villages, Islam and Catholicism were inscribed in and reinforced an existing social order (with all its hierarchies), Islamic and Christian mobilization in the cities established a new social order. Even if this religiosity was supported from below, it was not limited to local communities. Such communities as the Redeemed Christian Church of God in Nigeria, Milli Görüs in Europe, or the Gülen communities are very large, but they function in a different way from mainstream religious communities. They signalize the possibility of autonomous religious practices; as Semán has noted in the case of the Pentecostals, this leads “to a rapid spread of the groups who are allowed to establish their own religious institutions and, in the process, each express the specific characteristics of their experience and doctrine” (Semán 2011: 46). The migrant workers' religious communities in Germany formed umbrella organizations exactly in this spirit—for example, the Milli Görüs, the Verband der islamischen Kulturzentren (Association of Islamic Cultural Centers), and others. This gave them an efficient means of organizing such practical concerns as arranging pilgrimages, recruiting preachers, dealing with legal matters, and so on. This bottom-up organization is easily overlooked since, at the same time, it is connected with the adoption of a brand name and particular style. While externally they start resembling mainstream religious communities, they are marked by a significantly greater flexibility.

The propensity to large events, especially among the larger global prayer communities, is directly linked to this bottom-up structure. Ultimately, such mass events make the community visible in its entirety. This is where the community comes together, this is where it can be experienced as such, and in a way that can be read as the work of God. This applied just as much to the large events organized by Milli Görüs (Schiﬀauer 2010: 150–7; Tercan 2002) as to those arranged by the mainstream churches in Lagos (Ulak 2011). As on the local level, the community is a community of brothers and sisters—and not a bureaucratic organization existing separately and independently from the congregation. At large events, especially, spectacle and interiority are connected. Let us now conclude with the fourth point. Global prayers communities engage in missionary work—and not only in urban centers. As one of Gerda Heck's informants puts it, the aim is to bring “the gospel back to Europe.” One would be well advised to take this statement seriously. Missionary work means proclaiming the true and good in a space dominated by falsehood and evil. This is a direct attack on the North's (from an American and South American perspective) or West's (from an Islamic perspective) hegemonic claim of being the trustee of the good (as, for example, in representing democracy and human rights). In fact, for the reasons given above, many people in the South regard such a claim as mere hypocrisy. This also applies precisely to those institutions of which Europe is proud—such as the constitutional state. Taking migrants living in Germany illegally as an example, Kohlha gen (2006) has elaborated how the country's entire legal system appears to immigrants as nothing but a bulwark of exclusion. Whenever they have to deal with the law and its representatives, the law is applied to rob them of their livelihood. The key criticism of the borders defending Fortress Europe noted by Gerda Heck that, “The gospel doesn't know borders, neither do we” (Heck 2010) also has to be understood in this sense. After elaborating the commonalities, it may also be fruitful to highlight one of the differences between, primarily, Evangelical and Islamic communities. This relates to the nature of the charisma found in them. While in the Pentecostal churches, the personal charisma of a preacher called to the pulpit plays a role, in Islamic communities, it is rather a group charisma where the individual is stabilized through contact with the spirit of an in-group.

THE LATER PHASES

Even if global prayers were also employed as a socio-religious movement by a particular generation of urban migrants, this is not the end of the story. Overall, the self-organization and self-disciplining program had its effect. Since the mid-1990s at the latest, there can be no question any longer of these communities being limited to marginalized new urban residents. Instead, the communities have become differentiated—both in terms of class and age. A second generation of post-migrants has taken its place next to the first wave of immigrants and become the social carriers of the global prayers. In the context of migrants in Germany, I have described the situation of a second generation in the Islamic communities (Schiﬀauer 2010: 158f). The self-disciplining program of...
many first-generation members apparently created largely stable family situations which, in many cases, positively influenced the second generation’s success at school. Following Gramsci, I characterize the intellectuals in this second generation as organic intellectuals. On the one hand, they move with the greatest of ease in society and, on the other, are anchored in the community. Strikingly often, they have a pronounced feeling of gratitude and say that, without the support of the communities, they would not be where they are today. As a result, they are loyal to an extent which many “free-floating” intellectuals in the majority society find hard to understand. Through this feeling of commitment, they see themselves as having to realize a bridging and translating function into society. This generation is no longer outside; but inside and outside have interlocked in a fascinating way. One notable pattern here is that this generation does not become secularized—quite the contrary. In many respects, they are more religious than their parents. The translation tasks they have taken on, in particular, mean that they are engaging far more intensively with their religious heritage. Something can only be translated if one has really understood it—and this applies equally to translation in the other direction. The emotional power characterizing the first generation’s spirituality has given way to a religiosity that is calmer and more finely differentiated in its emotionality. At the same time, the attitude toward secular society has also changed. It is now no longer perceived as principally problematic. Instead, secularism is now viewed as the basis for interreligious cooperation on an equal footing. Following Asef Bayat, I describe this as “post-Islamism.”

The global prayers program was particularly successful in Turkey. Here, a second generation of post-Islamist reformers came into government after 2002, bringing the country an overall stable political situation and economic prosperity. This did not mean replacing or destroying urban secular culture—but setting it clear borders and limits. In the 2000s, the contrast between city districts influenced by Islam and secularism became more accentuated and distinct. In this volume, Ayşe Candar presents her research into the effects of the post-Islamist’s social advancement on the history and everyday culture of Başakşehir. She shows how an Islamic gated community is also, first and foremost, an Islamic gated community, i.e. how the imminent logic of social marginalization processes asserts itself against the original ideals and begins to dominate urban life. Candar’s study shows how originally secular ideals and lifestyles are themselves secularized through the appropriation of secular structures. For this reason, the two case studies of Heck and Candar are interesting for this topic since they demonstrate how the borders separating the spheres of the secular and the sacral in the modern world have not been abolished, but re-drawn. Space in the post-secular city is overlaid with secular and sacral structures. Post-Islamists are expert actors in secular society, and yet are integrated into a holistic religious community; the Başakşehir quarter is, on the one hand, the product of a religious vision which wanted to replace the dream of Kemalist modernity by an modernity influenced by Islam; on the other hand, it also shows how, as in a palimpsest, Kemalist modernity shimmers through the project of Islamic modernity.