

Migration and Religiousness

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The basis of this chapter is a comparison between the religiousness of the peasants of Subay¹ — a village in North Anatolia — and that of the migrants from the same village now living in Germany. In the process, I grapple with a question raised by Gellner (1969) in 'A Pendulum Swing Theory of Islam',² a question which, as far as I am concerned, has not been dealt with further or expanded: the question of the connection between societal context and religious attitude.

In this paper, religiousness encompasses: 1) the manner of ritual practice; 2) the relationship to religious and societal order — or, more precisely, to the *Şariat* (Turkish for *Sharia*); 3) the direction of religious thought and 4) the attitude to one's self. My hypothesis is that the changes which can be observed in this regard are the result of a restructuring of the religious community into a secular society. Due to the communal nature of Islam, this restructuring has far-reaching consequences.

Islam in Village Society

In Subay, the village society is, at the same time, the Islamic community. Those with whom one stands in a reciprocal political-legal as well as economic relationship are always brothers in faith, the same people seen Fridays in the mosque and with whom the great religious feasts are collectively experienced.

This means that the village society oscillates between two states according to a present rhythm dictated by the Islamic calendar. During secular times, the village appears to be comprised of a group of largely autonomous households which base their relationships on the values of honour (*namus*) and respect (*saygı*) and observe the reciprocal exchange of offerings and provocations.

During sacred times (the five times of prayer, Friday mornings, the month of fasting, the holy nights, the great religious feasts), this society changes into a religious community. Through the Islamic rituals, a social structure is established in which one does not stand in opposition to one's fellow man but rather beside him; in which one does not preserve one's honour against the others but collectively honours God; in which one does not exchange but shares; in which goods are given not because of mutual obligations but because of need; in which not competition and conflict but unity reigns.³

The oscillation between a secular and sacred order demonstrates that all mutual relationships not only possess a societal (i.e., political-legal) but also a communal (i.e., ethical-moral) character.⁴ Both elements stand in a complementary relationship to one another; they augment and correct each other. The peasants are unanimously convinced that a true community cannot be based solely on one element or the other. A community in which only mutual relationships of a political-legal nature were valid would collapse since everyone would feel responsible only to his own family or group. The powerful would triumph and there would exist no possibility to end a fight or a feud. It is said: 'Only he who fears God recognizes your rights as well' and 'Fear those who do not fear God'. Yet just as doomed is a community based solely on communal thoughts. It would be illusory to believe that one could live in legal security simply because all others are Muslims like oneself. One appeals to this (and says: 'Why do you do that to me? I am neither a *gavur* (unbeliever), nor a Christian.') yet knows that, in the end, one can exist only when reciprocity is established, when one provocation is answered by a counter-provocation. As beautiful as it would be if the structure of the community could be sustained by the mutual fear of God, daily life shows that the fear of one's neighbour must enter in as well.

The complementary relationship of secular and sacred order is expressed by the fact that the individual must have a status within both systems in order to be recognized as a person in Subay. One must be a Muslim as well as the member of a family whose honour and reputation are indisputable. If either of these is lacking, the individual becomes an outcast.

This relationship between religious community and society determines the peasant form of religiousness.

Ritual Practice

Let us now turn to ritual practice. From what has been said, it is clear that participation in rituals is never solely the expression of an individual's relationship to God; for, at the same time, the individual formulates a claim to membership in the community. I do not want to go so far as to assert that this political meaning of ritual fully pushes the religious one aside; nevertheless, it often seems to eclipse it and to be primary. Let us note the following statement by a young man raised in Subay:

They go to the mosque because everyone else goes there. They see: The people go to the mosque. So they go as well. When they pray, they pray without concentration or contemplation; instead, they think about their livestock and about what they want to buy . . . When the intention is lacking, then the *namaz* prayer [ritual prayer, *salat*] is nothing more than an exercise. That's the case with almost everyone. They're only Muslims in the following sense: If somebody comes along and ploughs under a piece of their land, then they say: 'Why do you trample upon my rights, the rights of a Muslim?' They're only Muslim as long as their rights are in question. For the *Kurban* [Turkish for *qurban*] feast, they make excuses and say that they had no money for a sacrifice. When the *Hoca* forbids something, they say: 'But everyone else does the same thing' and so they continue to do it.

In accordance with the political meaning of the ritual, value is placed on each household documenting its membership in the Islamic community. At least the head of the family, who represents the family in extra-familial affairs, must participate in the ritual. Occasionally the other members of the household even seem to consider it their duty to give him time off to participate. This was especially noticeable in 1977 when the Ramadan fell in midsummer. The threshing work and fasting were seen as incompatible. The solution, embraced by the majority of families, was to require the sons to break the fast and to carry out the work alone. In this way, the older men were freed to perform their ritual duties.

In this manner, ritual practice is seen not as the task of the individual but more as the task of the household as a whole. It therefore often seems extraordinarily external and formal. It is more important to demonstrate externally that one's own group is Islamic than it is to adopt a particular inner attitude.

The Attitude Towards the *Şeriat*

The complementary relationship between the two orders prevents the sacred order from becoming independent of the worldly order. I would like to clarify this by means of an example.

The *Bayramlaşmak* ritual — literally translated: 'to offer congratulations on the occasion of a feast' — is performed twice a year, namely at the time of the sugar feast (*Şeker Bayramı*) and the sacrificial feast (*Kurban Bayramı*). Following the service, the men of the community form a circle, taking their places according to their advancing ages. The youngest man then starts to work his way along the group and greets everyone — those only slightly older with a handshake, the others with the traditional kiss on the hand which shows respect. Then comes the second youngest, the third youngest, etc. until the group has been rolled up, so to speak. The ritual is considered an atonement ritual: The conflicts which threaten to disrupt the religious community are ritually ended and the ideal order of the brotherly community (represented by the circle in which the younger men demonstrate their respect for the older men) is once again established.

During a discussion about this ceremony with Mustafa 'the Snail', I asked

him how he deals with his longstanding enemy, the tobaccoconist, in such a situation. His reply was simple: 'I just pass him by.'

To me, this attitude seems characteristic of their ways of dealing with the two orders. Their oppositional nature and their contradictions are clearly recognized. But they cannot be resolved. The divine order cannot assert itself over the reality of the worldly order; after all, the conflicts in the secular sphere determine the course of the ritual as well. Nevertheless, the divine order is not questioned because of this. The ritual continues to be practised and is taken seriously. It displays the ideal which must be firmly upheld, despite reality, if the society is not to disintegrate. It is not reality . . . and yet it is anything but an illusion.

For me, this knowledge determines the peasants' attitude to the *Şeriat*. Hardly a soul in the village opposes the notion that the reintroduction of the *Şeriat* would be desirable for Turkey. Yet there are no lofty hopes linked to this. In a conversation with a republican-minded migrant, he was not contradicted when he claimed that it would set the country back fifty years. The reactions were rather defiant: 'And even if, then at least it is an Islamic country.' An attitude which, in its matter-of-factness, differs markedly from the hopes for a theocracy, as we shall see during the discussion of the situation of the migrants.

The Direction of Religious Thought

In this context, religious thought mostly takes the form of collective self-certainty. During the religious conversations, one constantly imagines the communal possession of norms, values and assessments. In the process, the classification of acts is usually central: Which ones are necessary (*farz*) or merely recommended (*eflat*), which ones frowned upon (*makruh*) or forbidden (*haram*). Discussed are questions such as whether the sin of eating pork is greater or less than that of drinking Raki, or how one can accumulate the most religious merit (*sevap*). The consequences in the hereafter for disregarding rules is just as avidly dealt with. Religious talks often sound judicial. They are marked by no pensive search for the meaning of a text or rule, no speculation about God and the world; it is much more central to them to swear to uphold the laws and the instructions for carrying them out — the basis of the communal order. Usually, very familiar and obvious points are discussed, as if a collectively inherited treasure is removed from a chest, held up to view for a moment and then put back: an undertaking both satisfying and communally supportive.

The Concern With One's Self

Given the ritual practice and the form of religious thought, it should come as no surprise that the individuals see their religious obligations as a mountain of debts which are to be paid off as completely as possible during their lifetime. These obligations, especially the *namaz* prayer (ritual prayer) and fasting, are

generally considered to be a burden. That does not rob them of value but, on the contrary, bestows importance upon them. Anyone who thinks he will be able to be redeemed without completing these unpleasant tasks is met with utter disbelief. He is accused of being interested in only the pleasant side of religious life, so to speak. "You Christians have only *dua* prayers (prayers of supplication) and no *namaz* prayers. Do you really believe you'll go to Heaven if you make it so easy on yourselves?"

The attitude which is biased against the obligations is also evident in the peasant interpretation of the institution of *kaza* (Turkish for *kadda*), the main possibility in Islam of 'catching up' on religious duties. The younger men make ample use of this possibility; they avoid fasting and prayer with the intention of making up what they have neglected when they are old (when, one has the impression, the interest in sinning naturally dies out, anyway). With increasing age, the feeling of being in God's debt constantly grows. One starts praying regularly in order — as they say — 'not to die still owing a debt to God'. Countless elderly men rise early to make up the prayers they neglected in their youth.⁵

Islam Abroad

Within the complex society in which the migrant worker finds himself, the relationship between the individual, the Islamic community and society as a whole has a totally different structure. The relations in the religious community are no longer identical with the totality of the economic, political and social relations of the individual. They exist as specifically religious alongside other societal relations. In the religious community, one no longer encounters the person with whom one has societal exchange relationships but a person of similar mind. Consequently, the specifically peasant experience of an oscillation of one's social world between the states of religious community and society is no longer present. During sacred times, society no longer changes into a religious community but, rather, one leaves the society and enters the religious community — if possible, we must add, since the opposition between secular and sacred times is now determined by the more fundamental notions of the working day and leisure. Membership in the religious community is therefore irrelevant for one's societal standing; it no longer bestows any political-legal status but becomes a private affair.⁶

Although this is also the case in the urban centres of Turkey, one still notices that this change of structure is especially entrenched among those residing abroad in Europe. Added to this, the religious community often becomes a counterweight to the secular society as well as a place of retreat, a haven.⁷ It becomes a counterweight insofar as it is the place where, in a Christian environment, the Islamic (as well as the Turkish) norms and values are maintained and tended to. Such a place naturally gains importance if one wishes to pass on these norms and values through the socialization process. When the peasants from

Subay send their children to a Quran course, their concern about a Turkish upbringing plays just as great a role as their concern about their children's religious education. The religious community becomes a haven insofar as it is a place where one is treated with respect and esteem, a place where the value and dignity of the individual are recognized — as opposed to the external society in which one often feels discriminated against and humiliated.

Especially in Germany, the religious community and the society no longer stand in a complementary relationship but rather in opposition to one another. That is why the specific character of the respective relationship is more pronounced than it is back in the village. On one side are the 'cold' societal relationships characterized by exploitation, discrimination and injustice; on the other side are the 'warm' and brotherly relationships characterized by mutual respect and esteem. In this religious community of the similarly minded, one no longer needs the tricks that Mustafa 'the Snail' had to resort to back in the village: societal reality, so to speak, stops at the door.⁸

In order to describe the consequences of this fact for religiousness, I will concentrate primarily on one migrant in particular, namely Yaşar Fuad who lives in Augsburg.

Ritual Practice

Given the new position of the religious community in society, ritual practice changes its symbolic value as well. One no longer expresses, as in the village, affiliation with the society as a whole but, through ritual practice, one bears witness to one's place in a minority group. The ritual is no longer demanded by the general public but, rather, ridiculed and quite often it has to be carried out despite outside opposition.

Today in the Islamic community, it is absolutely essential that a self-aware (*kendine bilen*) Muslim uphold his Islam. Today it is necessary for a Muslim to perform the *namaz* prayer and to obey fasting and — how can I put it? — to shun what is *haram* (ritually forbidden). To do all that here is very difficult, since none of it is considered normal.

Active membership in this minority group often means a denial of all those who do not belong to the group. However, not everyone goes so far as Yaşar who refused to visit a migrant from his own village with the following reasoning: "He doesn't pray, he doesn't fast. Why should I see him?" Through ritual practice one also dissociates oneself from German society: this is especially obvious (and especially serious) in the case of the socialization of the children. Yaşar, for example, does not send his children to kindergarten. On the one hand, he is afraid they will become estranged from him through the influence of the German teacher; moreover, his concern that they will receive sausage there (i.e., pork) also plays a role. His nine-year-old son already embodies the father's dissociation to a large extent. His father told me that his son does not

play with German children because he doesn't like them — they smell of pork. In the children's centre where he goes for tutoring and help with his homework, the boy refused to make a plaster mask. "We Muslims don't do such things." Yaşar is proud of his son's attitude.

This encourages the development of purely religious motivation. When the rituals are performed by the diaspora, they are usually against the society and mainly out of concern for one's fate in the hereafter.⁹ Mahiye Eren's statement is illustrative in this regard: "In this world, the Germans laugh about our head-scarves; in the next world, they will regret it." This shows a more individualized approach to religion where social control is replaced by individual responsibility for one's fate. Yaşar Fuad:

As a Muslim, I prefer the Islamic path. I live in accordance with this path. I follow this path. But if others do not walk this path, I don't care. Each person has a mind and common sense; each person must decide for himself. . . . Each must consider how he wants to spend his lifetime.

A result of this is that, in terms of religious practice, the migrants vary much more among themselves than do the peasants in their native village. Some heads of households are negligent to an extent that would never occur back in the village. For example, Mahiye Eren's husband: "He says: *Burası Almanya* — 'This is Germany' — and doesn't fast and doesn't go to the mosque." Others, like Yaşar, take religious practice much more seriously. Especially noticeable, however, is that, to women, religious practice increases in importance within the migrant situation. In the Eren family, the traditional roles in this regard are totally reversed: there it is the woman who attends to Islam and no longer the man.¹⁰

The New Attitude to the *Şeriat*

The transformed structure of the relationships between religious community and society is evident in the attitude towards order demonstrated and actualized in ritual. In the village, the vision of a brotherly and just society stands in a reciprocal relationship to societal reality. The two orders correct and augment one another. With the separation of religious community and society, the vision becomes autonomous as well. Now it is placed only in opposition to the existing society. In rituals, what is shown is no longer what the society *also* is but what it *not yet* is. A radiant future is anticipated. This leads to criticism of the present. Under the conditions of a complex society, Islam becomes, as Waardenburg formulated it, a "vehicle of protest" (Waardenburg 1984). From the ideal is born a utopia or, for the more sceptical migrants, an illusion.

Now millennial hopes can embrace the idea of the reintroduction of the *Şeriat*. Yaşar Fuad believes that, with its reintroduction, the present situation will turn into its opposite. In long statements, he saw the lack of the *Şeriat* as the root of all evil in the world. Two passages are telling in this regard:

There is unrest today in all the countries of the world. Why? Because Islam is not alive. Islam is not practised, the commandments of Islam are not heard; that's why the countries, the people, the rich, the poor — all are restless. . . . The representatives, the heads of state have a responsibility. The people vote for them. . . . But as soon as they become representatives, they are no longer interested in us. All this unrest is present because people no longer live according to God's laws, because people no longer use and apply them.

Since people do not know Islam, they know no humanity. They think only of themselves. Take the employer of today, for example. An employer has to respect my rights as long as he employs me. . . . But, unfortunately, he doesn't do that. He's always thinking only of his pocketbook, not about his workers. He doesn't think about you, whether you have children, a wife, children to educate or not. Yet that's really his human responsibility and duty. Islam teaches us about this. Islam says: 'A shepherd is responsible for the flock he is tending.'

While Islam is also the 'vehicle of protest' in urban Turkey, residence abroad still fosters a more precise and more concrete form of criticism. From without — and in comparison with Germany — some faults in Turkey are seen more clearly. The logical problem which arises for a Muslim fundamentalist when he finds the institutions of a Christian country admirable was solved by Yaşar by means of two arguments. The first is based on the thesis that Germany has taken up and furthered the traditions of the Ottoman Empire:

If we turn and look at [public relations in] official public offices and hospitals for example, the Germans today display, in their behaviour and activities, what we had under the Ottoman Empire. In Turkey today, no one can expect similar treatment. . . . For example, a German walks into an office and unloads his problem. The official helps him; he does his job. But that's not the case in our country. With us, the officials have better things to do. . . .¹¹

This rationalization allows the experience in Germany to be used for the formulation of the ideal of an Islamic republic. The second argument can be summarized in the following way: if something is already practised in Germany, a Christian country, then it is opportune that it be practised in Turkey as well:

In Germany, taxes are collected for all churches. In Turkey we have mosques, but no taxes are collected for them. The government doesn't help the mosques. They have to rely on the people for their financial support.

A variation of this argument suggests that if certain modes of behaviour or patterns of dress are already allowed in Germany, then they should be allowed in Turkey as well.

Here, for example, we can wear veils or grow a beard. We can live freely in every sense. In Germany there is no law regarding dress as there is in Turkey. . . . That's why we can't dress there like we want to as Muslims. So, in this sense, we can live better in Germany.

Utopia clamours to be actualized; it entails a political mission. Yaşar tries to carry out this mission by voicing his position publicly. He is aware of the convincing power of openly-practised prayer. Consequently, he tries to win the fight to be able to pray at work. The Germans would then come over, look and say: "What kind of faith is that, that's practised with such conviction?" They would inform themselves and convert to Islam. "If all Turks who have come here were serious Muslims, then the Germans would have converted to Islam by now."

The Direction of Religious Thought

One of the most basic consequences of the new relationship between the religious community and society is that one no longer automatically belongs to a given community; the community (and the religious leader) can now be chosen according to how convincingly it (he) represents Islam.¹² In the process, everyone sees that the differences in the religious communities do not affect the cult but rather political questions — how the utopia is to be actualized — and normative questions relating to the individual aspects of one's lifestyle:

I was a member of the *Milli Görüşçü* [National View]. I left the group. Now I'm a member of the *Tebliğ* community [Announcement group]. The aim . . . of the *Tebliğ* community is the following: We want to live according to God's commands and to tell others about them. Nothing more. The others, however, have a specific goal: They support a particular party's political line. Besides that, there's no difference; the Quran courses are the same. The Quran is taught the same way in the *Süleymaniye*, *Nurcu*, *Milli Görüşçü*, and the *Tebliğ* communities. There's no change. . .

Yaşar left the *Milli Görüşçü* and joined the *Tebliğ* community because of his political pragmatism. He was convinced that an Islamic republic could be established only through a mass movement similar to the one in Iran, not through supporting an Islamic party which, because it is tied to the constitution, is forced to compromise itself.

Yaşar's decision shows a new form of religious thought. The individual's search for truth takes over from collective self-certainty. Yaşar is very well aware of this. He sees his search for the right community and the right path as far from over. As we were watching a video tape of a sermon by Cemaltein Kaplan — one of the foremost religious leaders of the *Tebliğ* movement — he exclaimed:

I'm searching for the truth. That's why I left the *Milli Görüşçü*. I'll keep searching. Perhaps one day I will leave this man (pointing to Cemaltein Kaplan) as well and turn to another.

The succession of religious communities one joins in the course of one's life thus becomes a type of special religious biography:

I woke up in the city. When I came to Istanbul . . . what was in Istanbul? A religious community existed there . . . I found good people there, made good friends, went with them to hear the *Hocas* [religious teachers] and to pray the *namaz* in the mosque . . . Later, when I came to Germany, I took a second step. Here I've gotten to know religious communities that are outlawed in Turkey.

The Concern With One's Self

The individualizing of religious practice and the new form of the religious quest corresponds to a changed relationship with one's self. Let us once again listen to Yaşar:

Back in our village . . . the parents are uneducated; they also don't send their children to someone who knows more. Look, when I was young I went with my father to the mosque. But only after I came to Istanbul did the love of faith begin for me. Then, for example, I bought books about faith . . . I went to the mosque to pray the *namaz*; I educated myself in this way. But how are those in the village supposed to educate themselves? (*Kendimi öyle yetiştirdim. Ama onlar nerede yetiştirecek köyde.*)

The key phrase here is: "I educated myself." This bespeaks a totally new concern with the self. In the village, the aim was to reduce an objectively existing mountain of sacred debts, so to speak; in the process, little importance was placed on one's inner conviction. Yet that is now precisely Yaşar's point. For him, prayer is no longer merely an obligation which has to be 'paid off' but, instead, primarily an exercise in the "Islamization of one's self" (Nagel).

First, this is shown in a changed interpretation of the *kaza*, the possibility of making up prayers. The natural acceptance with which it is utilized in the village is no longer valid for Yaşar. For him, there is a marked difference as to whether the prayer which one makes up was neglected for a good reason or simply because of a lack of interest and desire:

But did I neglect the *namaz* prayer on a whim or was I forced to neglect it? Only when I was forced to neglect it is my debt paid by a *kaza* prayer. If, however, I neglected it out of a lack of interest or desire — then it is in God's hands. There's a big difference between neglect out of necessity and neglect out of self-interest.

Consequently, Yaşar criticizes the swiftness with which the peasants in his native village have an excuse at hand to relieve them from praying.

What they say [about work leaving them no time to pray] is no excuse. The *namaz* prayer takes ten minutes. Ten minutes! One prays the *namaz* five times a day, and three of these times, if need be, at work.

Decisive for me is that Yaşar lives the consequences of this critique in his daily life. He does not make it easy on himself. For example, even against the will of most Turkish co-workers, he tries to see that one may pray at work. As of now, he still has to perform his prayer there in secret. Whereas in the village the

prayer is neglected when it could well have been performed, Yaşar tries to perform it under the most difficult of circumstances.

This much more methodical lifestyle means that religious practice has shifted from a question of which phase one finds oneself in to a question of lifestyle in general. The decision to embrace Islam becomes an existential question which is posed without reference to one's age:

They say: 'We're still young . . . when we're over forty we'll fulfil our religious duties.' That's what you always hear . . . For example, there are people who say to me: 'Why do you wear a beard when you're still so young?' But Islam does not differentiate between young and old. One must say: 'Perhaps I will die tomorrow' . . . Would I then have time to grow a beard? I also regret that I've not yet been able to go on the pilgrimage. Since I was sixteen, I've seen the *hac* [Turkish for *hajj*] as my duty.

Not only is the concern about performing prayers more intensive but also the attitude which is adopted during prayer. Unlike the peasants, Yaşar concentrates hard when praying. Likewise, he criticizes the village practice of talking in a relatively uninhibited manner when in the vicinity of someone praying. He considers this to be distracting for the person demonstrating his faith:

Yes, that's not right. Your talking upsets the thoughts of the one praying. If we talk while a brother is over in the corner praying the *namaz*, then we distract him. Either we have to talk very softly so he'll not be able to hear us or he'll have to go elsewhere to pray the *namaz*. . . .

This consideration shown to the praying person, unheard of in the village, portrays very clearly the new meaning of prayer. Whereas in the village it is done to pay off one's debt, it is now to educate one's self.¹³

In this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate the importance of the migration process for the development of religiousness. It should be clear that, above all, I understand the migration of workers as a process of urbanization. Consequently, the development shown here would not be markedly different in Turkey itself as opposed to in Germany. However, the unusual quality of life abroad contributes to an accentuation of this process. Under these conditions, the development of specifically urban (and modern) structures of consciousness can be more clearly observed than in the native country.

Notes

1. All proper names have been changed.
2. The thesis was subsequently taken up and expanded in *Muslim Society* (1981).
3. Among others, T. Nagel refers to the representation of Islamic order through ritual: *So hat das rituelle Gebet, das am Freitag im gemeinschaftlichen Gottesdienst ausgeführt werden soll, nicht nur den Charakter einer Zwiesprache des Menschen*

mit dem Schöpfer, sondern auch einer Demonstration der Mitgliedschaft im islamischen Staat. Im Freitagsgottesdienst wird das Gemeinwesen veranschaulicht (1981: 15). In this connection, I consider above all the rules regarding the distribution of alms and the sacrificial animal to be important as well (compare Soyman and Schmiede 1960: 52-3).

4. I use the terms religious community (*Gemeinschaft*) and society (*Gesellschaft*) here in Weber's sense (1972: 21 ff.).
5. Regarding the concern with paying one's religious debts, which dominates religious life in the village, see Schiffauer 1984a.
6. See also Sayad 1983.
7. This structural change is especially pronounced when it concerns an individual form of migration (as in the migration from Subay) so that the (partial) reconstitution of the original community, characteristic for the *chain migration*, does not occur. For a comparison of the two types of migration see, above all, Engelbrektsen (1978). The pattern of the migration from Subay strongly parallels the migration from Alghan, one of the two villages studied by Engelbrektsen.
8. By this I don't want to imply that the religious community is a sphere without conflicts. However it seems to me that the character of conflicts changes considerably in the context of migration. The conflicts in the village community bear, so to say, a societal stamp; the conflicts in the urban community have a much more 'immanent' character: they centre usually around questions concerning the correct interpretation of Islam. This shows in a certain readiness to accept splits of the community for dogmatic reasons. Compare for example Waardenburg's representation in this volume of the processes of fusion and fission of the Islamic communities in the Netherlands.
9. Shop owners, especially grocers, are possibly an exception. As diaspora, they can also (or just) earn symbolic capital through religious practice. Compare Blaschke 1984.
10. In another article I have extensively portrayed Mahiye Eren who joined the *Nurcu* community in Berlin (Schiffauer 1984a). Despite all the similarities with Yaşar Fuad who is chiefly discussed in the present paper, there are still characteristic differences which can be linked to the varied social situations of men and women. Consequently, for Mahiye, the political differences in the individual groups are less important than for Yaşar; instead, she, more than Yaşar, is concerned with a basis and justification of her daily life.
11. In this argument strategy, one notices again a widely used motif: . . . (*Es hat sich in der islamischen Welt ein umfangreiches Schrifttum entwickelt, das sich die Aufgabe stellt nachzuweisen, daß alle die Errungenschaften der modernen europäischen politischen Kultur längst durch die šari'a vorweggenommen worden seien, die westlichen Verfassungen also nur in äußerst unvollkommener Form — sie sind doch Menschenwerk — dazulegen versuchten, was seit eh und je den Kern islamischen politischen Denkens ausmache.*) (Nagel 1981 (11):257).
12. This moment of individual choice of the religious community by the faithful runs throughout Islamic history: it is a moment at which the attempted control of teachings by the state has often failed. Thus in the ninth and tenth centuries, the traditionalists asserted themselves against the Mutazilites who were backed by the Abbasids. (Nagel 1981 (1):179-81). In more recent times, the movement of the Muslim Brothers serves as a good example. (Compare, for example, Hanafi 1984).
13. The connection between life abroad and the education of one's self has been recognized by the Sufi teachers. Consequently, travel for a mystic like Sulami plays a great role. *Es wird als Möglichkeit angesehen, Stolz und Dünkelhaftigkeit der Seele zu brechen. Man rät den Brüdern in die Fremde zu wandern und sich dort aufzuhalten, wo man verachtet wird, weil man unbekannt ist.* (Nagel 1981 (1):409).

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10

The Tabligh Organization in Belgium

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Among the numerous Muslim religious groups that have emerged in Belgium, particularly in the past fifteen years,¹ the Jama'at at-Tabligh no doubt holds a special position by virtue of the strength of its presence and the impact of its activities. This article attempts to answer the question of whether we are witnessing today an increasing influence of the Tabligh over the Arab mosques in Belgium. But the basic orientation of this chapter is to study the Tabligh primarily from the viewpoint of the sociology of organizations and of social movements. There are two reasons for this endeavour. One of them is theoretical: the intention being to assess the relevance and fruitfulness of sociological tools with respect to a Muslim religious grouping. The other derives from an analysis of the Tabligh as such, and consists of the hypothesis that its success is due as much to its cultural and ideological appropriateness to the situation of immigrant populations as to its capacity to develop a complex organization capable of responding to the demands emanating out of multiple contexts.

The Jama'at at-Tabligh

The Jama'at at-Tabligh is a kind of religious organization which was founded by Muhammad Ilyas (1885–1944) between 1920 and 1940 in the north of India.² The present centre of this movement is in Nizam Ud-Din, close to Delhi, where the founder's grave is also located. He died in 1944 and was succeeded by his son Yusuf. Since the death of the latter in 1965, the movement has been directed by In'am ul-Hassan, the founder's cousin.

The Jama'at at-Tabligh, while being modern in organization and mode of operation, has traits which emanate from the Sufi tradition to