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1
THE LENINIST PHENOMENON

THE LENINIST RESPONSE

In both liberal and Leninist regimes (in contrast to peasant-status societies), social action is primarily oriented to impersonal norms.[1] What is particular about Leninist regimes is that impersonality is not expressed in procedural values and rules (i.e., due process), but rather in the charismatic impersonality of the party organization. The novelty of Leninism as an organization is its substitution of charismatic impersonality for the procedural impersonality dominant in the West.

The concept of charismatic impersonality is not readily digested, because it seems to be a contradiction in terms. The reaction to it is likely to be simple rejection, or a redefinition in terms that are more familiar, such as the routinization of charisma. But routinization is not what I am talking about. My focus (at least at this point) is on the unit designated as having extraordinary powers and being "worthy" of loyalty and sacrifice. In Leninism, that unit is THE Party.

As a means of demonstrating that the Leninist party is novel

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1. This does not mean that liberal and Leninist regimes are the only conceivable means of establishing impersonal norms as authoritative action referents and determinants. However, I am impressed by the lack of success most other types of regimes in peasant societies have had in attempting to create a nationally effective set of institutions based on impersonal norms. To argue that Leninist regimes have been successful in this direction is not to argue that all spheres of social life are influenced to the same extent by these norms, that informal behavior based on personalistic norms does not exist, or that the definition and efficacy of such norms is not subject to developmental considerations.

in character, I shall offer a new and operational definition of charisma, contrast Leninism with Nazism, and develop the notion of the "correct line" as a character-defining feature of Leninist organization.

Charisma is not a concept that has suffered benign or any other kind of neglect. Nor should it. Discussion of it continues because it is a central feature of behaviors that recur and are seen as politically and socially significant.

For me there is one striking and defining quality of charismatic leaders. A charismatic leader dramatically reconciles incompatible commitments and orientations. It is in this sense that the charismatic is a revolutionary agent—someone who is able in certain social circumstances institutionally to combine (with varying degrees of success for varying degrees of time) orientations and commitments that until then were seen as mutally exclusive. It is the extraordinary and inspirational quality of such a leader that makes possible the recasting of previously incompatible elements into a new unit of personal identity and organizational membership, and the recommitment of (some) social groups to that unit.

Christ created a new unit—the Church—through his recasting of elements that had before been mutally exclusive—namely, commitment to Judaism as a corporate and parochial ethnic identity and incorporation of the Gentile world. For a significant range of social groups, Christ recast the terms of personal identity and organizational membership. To argue this is not to suggest that historical events did not play a critical role in the evolution of this doctrine and organization. Events after Christ's death make the importance of historical contingency quite clear.[2] One does not have to slight history or sociology in order to make the central point: for the comparativist (in contrast to the theologian), Christ's innovation was to combine in an inspirational fashion elements that had previously been mutually exclusive. He created a new unit of membership.

Hitler did with German nationalism and "Aryanism" what Christ did with Jews and Gentiles. The tension between Hitler's

2. See, for example, Hugh J. Schonfield, *The Pentecost Revolution* (London: Macdonald and Jane's St. Giles House, 1974), passim.

commitment to German nationalism and "Aryanism" is a defining quality of his movement. Hitler's orientation was not simply or exclusively to the German nation. Rather, he brought together in ideology and organization (e.g., in the SS) orientations and commitments that had been in critical respects and under different auspices highly conflictual—the exclusivity of ethnic nationalism and racial, supra-ethnic exclusivity.

If this conception of the defining quality of a charismatic leader is correct, one would predict that upon such a leader's death, his movement would be subject to splits representing the individual conflicting elements the leader had been able to unite. Thus, on Christ's death, his movement should have split into "Jewish" and "Gentile" factions. It did. The circumstances of Hitler's death make a parallel observation difficult. But even during his lifetime, one could observe some groupings more oriented to German nationalism (e.g., army factions) and others to a transnational "Aryan" line (e.g., SS members).

Lenin took the fundamentally conflicting notions of individual heroism and organizational impersonalism and recast them in the form of an organizational hero—the Bolshevik Party. His "party of a new type" was just that: a recasting of orientations that remained conflictual but were no longer mutally exclusive.[3] Lenin's innovation was to create an organization and membership effectively committed to conflicting practices—command and obedience with debate and discussion; belief in inexorable laws of historical change with empirical investigation of social development; heroic action with a persistent concern for the scientific and sober operation of an economy and society; and an emphasis on individual revolutionary heroism with an emphasis on the superordinate impersonal authority of the Party, itself the central heroic actor and focus of emotional commitment.

The manner and extent to which these different elements have been institutionally combined have varied significantly in the developmental history of the Soviet and Soviet-type re-

3. "Democratic Centralism" was for Lenin what "Nazi Germanism" was for Hitler and "Gentile Messiah" for Christ—i.e., a recasting of mutally exclusive elements into a conflictually based but practically effective new paradigm of membership and action.

gimes.[4] Yet crucial as the variations are, any attempt to grasp their significance depends on an appreciation of the central element in Lenin's innovation: the conflictual but effective recasting of charismatic-heroic and organizational-impersonal orientations in the form of a party in which heroism is defined in organizational, not individual, terms.

To argue that the novelty of Leninism as a political form is that it effectively recasts the mutually exclusive elements of individual heroism and organizational impersonalism is not to say there have not been historical precedents; nor is it to say that such an institutional amalgam of charismatic and modern orientations is constantly weighted in the same fashion. Religious organizations such as the Jesuits and Benedictines and military organizations such as the U.S. Marines are in certain respects instances of charismatic impersonalism. And as I have suggested at several points, Leninist regimes weigh and define charismatic and modern orientations quite differently over time. What is distinctive about Leninism as an instance of charismatic impersonalism—that is, as an institutional amalgam of charismatic and modern orientations—is that both these orientations are central to its definition. This contrasts with religious organizations whose secular-empirical orientations are ideally subordinate to nonmaterial, supernatural rationales. This argument obviously does not apply to a military organization, such as the Marines, that combines heroic orientations and technical-secular ones. However, the central place of war as a defining orientation for such an organization differentiates it from a Leninist party. To be sure, the revolutionary commitments of a Leninist party can be seen as comparable—and at certain points identical—to a war orientation. However, the Party's equally strong commitments to industrialization, scientific development, and economic planning as more than adjuncts to a war mission suggest an organization of a different order.

The difference among these types of charismatic-impersonal organizations, then, is by no means absolute, but it is significant.

4. I outline a model with static and dynamic features to account for the variations in chapters 3 and 5.

As suggested, it lies in the greater consistency that characterizes the place and role of modern elements in the Leninist amalgam. In ideal terms, these elements are less ad hoc, less instrumental, and more central to Leninism as a form of charismatic impersonalism.

To sustain an argument that Lenin's innovation as a charismatic leader was to create a political organization whose defining feature was charismatic impersonalism, one must come to grips with two outstanding and central "challenges" from Soviet history. The most obvious challenge to the argument presented here is Stalin's personal charismatic role from the time of the Seventeenth Congress in 1934 through 1953. However, there is a prior challenge, and that is the personal charisma Lenin possessed vis-à-vis his Bolshevik followers.

More than anyone, Robert Tucker has convincingly outlined the features of Lenin's personal charisma. In Tucker's words, "to be a Bolshevik in the early years was not so much to accept a particular set of beliefs as it was to gravitate into the orbit of Lenin as a political mentor, revolutionary strategist, and personality."[5] The Bolshevik colony in Geneva "proved to be a group of people who regarded themselves as Lenin's disciples and were worshipful in their attitude towards him. Although he was then only 33 years old, they habitually referred to him as the 'Old Man' (*starik*), thereby expressing profound respect for his Marxist erudition and his wisdom in all matters pertaining to revolution."[6] Lenin's charismatic status was, of course, enhanced and confirmed by his personal role in the October Revolution. Tucker makes a very strong case for what he terms the "leader-centered movement."

Without denying the significance of Lenin's personal charisma or the extent to which Leninism was and remains a movement with a strong leader orientation, I feel Tucker's argument is somewhat misleading. This is not because he fails to recognize elements in Lenin's behavior that are inconsistent with personal charisma, but rather because Tucker does not system-

5. Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Lenin Anthology* (New York: Norton, 1975), p. xiv.
6. Ibid.

atically relate Lenin's personal qualities to the defining features of the party he created.

In contrast, in a study entitled "The Great Headmaster," Edmund Wilson describes Lenin in terms that are quite literally coincident with those I have used to describe his Party. The core of Wilson's description is contained in the following passage:

> Though he [Lenin] was susceptible . . . to very strong personal attachments which survived political differences . . . [he] could no more allow these feelings to influence his political action than the headmaster can allow himself to be influenced in the matter of grades or discipline by his affection for a favorite pupil.[7]

In a society where personal attachments were an integral part of social organization, Lenin's detachment was culturally revolutionary. Furthermore, this personal detachment was placed in the service of a political organization designed to mirror his own qualities. In this light, Tucker's comments on Lenin's actions as Party leader and in response to the growing cult of his person take on added meaning. According to Tucker, "As supreme leader, [Lenin] did not simply issue commands to the ruling group; he did not rule by arbitrary Diktat. Automatic acquiescence in his position was not expected."[8] And when Lenin became aware that he was being made the object of a personality cult, he responded negatively. He summoned one of his aides in the Council of People's Commissars and asked:

> What is this? How could one permit it? . . . They write that I'm such and such, exaggerate everything, call me a genius, a special kind of man. Why, this is horrible. . . . All our lives we have carried on an ideological struggle against the glorification of personality, of the individual. We long ago solved the question of heroes.[9]

Lenin's reference to the "question of heroes" should not be treated casually. There is a sense in which both Leninism and Nazism emphasize the heroic ethic. It is not in the appreciation of heroism that Leninism differs from Nazism; it is in the des-

7. Edmund Wilson, *To the Finland Station* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1953), p. 391.
8. Tucker, *Lenin Anthology*, p. lvi.
9. Ibid., p. lx.

ignation of the heroic agent. For Lenin, the Party is hero[10]—not the individual leader. The fact that Lenin possessed personal charisma is not as significant as the way in which he defined charisma and related it to the organization he created. As an individual, he combined forceful charismatic certainty with a genuine and persistent emphasis on empirical and impersonal modes of investigation and interaction. His party was created (so to speak) in his own image. And that image was distinctive in its novel recasting of elements—heroism, arbitrariness, and absolute certainty, along with impersonal discipline, planning, and empirical investigation.

One might well remark that perhaps there was a novel recasting of such elements during Lenin's lifetime, but certainly not afterwards—not during the period of "high" Stalinism from the 17th Party Congress in 1934 through 1953. As an observation, this remark is valuable; as a conclusion, it is superficial. In fact, an examination of Stalinism is the best way to point out the differences between Nazism and Leninism and single out the defining features of Leninism.

Certainly the formal similarities between Stalinism and the Nazi regime are striking and by no means all superficial. The cult of personality that surrounded Stalin (and that has at times surrounded other Leninist leaders) was in a basic respect every bit as intense as that surrounding Hitler. Even more significant than the cult of personality was the Stalinist "cult of cadres," captured in the saying "The cadres decide everything." Under Stalinism, the Party and regime organization might be viewed as no more than an aggregation of hierarchically ordered heroes—again quite like Nazi organization. These consequential similarities do indeed allow for and call for comparison. However, the comparison itself reveals a character-defining difference between Stalinist Leninism and Nazism that is more important than the similarities.

In a relatively (and inexplicably) ignored article on factionalism in the Nazi Party, Joseph Nyomarkey has spelled out the

10. A study examining heroism as an integral component of Leninism's conception of the cadre, the Party itself, the idealized character of the working class, and its images of postcapitalist society would be of great value.

difference between Stalinist Leninism and Nazism quite well. Nyomarkey is intrigued by the fact that in Nazism there does not appear to have been the same incidence or type of factionalism that appears in Leninism. His explanation is that there are two types of movements—charismatic and ideological. In a charismatic movement (i.e., Nazism), "the leader claims authority because he incorporates the idea in his person," while in an ideological movement (i.e., Stalinist Leninism), "the leaders will claim authority on the basis of the dogma, and will always represent themselves as its representatives."[11] Nyomarkey goes on to argue that in an ideological movement, it is the "dogma which ultimately holds the group together and which lends authority to the leader . . . [and] the dogma which can give rise to various interpretations which can in turn become the bases of factional conflicts."[12]

The point is crucial. It suggests that even under Stalin, the formal or ideal basis of Leninist party organization, membership definition, and policy formulation was independent from his personal insight. Can it be shown to have mattered? In several ways. First, Stalin had difficulty in establishing a führer position, whereas Nazism was defined precisely in terms of the *Führerprinzip*. Second, there is potentially within the Leninist party a legitimate basis for someone like Khrushchev to attack both the "cult of personality" and the notion that "the cadres decide everything."[13] A third and even more telling piece of evidence has to do with a character-defining feature of Stalinism itself: the idea of a "correct line." An appreciation of the place and meaning of this notion in Leninism (and Stalinism as one expression of Leninism) goes a long way in helping to delineate the novelty of Leninism as a distinctive amalgam of charismatic and modern (i.e., impersonal, analytic, and empirical) elements.

At the 16th Party Congress in 1930, Stalin addressed himself

11. Joseph Nyomarkey, "Factionalism in the National Socialist German Workers' Party, 1925–1926: The Myth and Reality of the 'Northern Faction,'" *Political Science Quarterly* 80, no. 1 (March 1965): 45.
12. Ibid.
13. George Breslauer emphasizes Khrushchev's critical stance toward the party cadres (apparatchiks) in "Khruschchev Reconsidered," *Problems of Communism* 25, no. 5 (September–October 1976): 18–34.

to the question of leadership. What—he asked—guaranteed that the Party would be an effective political organization? Was it the presence of a great leader? Someone privileged in his insight into the working of history? Stalin answered no. "For correct leadership by the Party it is necessary, apart from everything else, that the Party should have a correct line."[14] However, in 1930 Stalin had not yet attained the "sultanist" leadership that was to be his after 1934.[15] His comments at the 18th Party Congress in 1939—at a time when his personal mastery of the Party was well established—thus have added importance. Stalin once again turned to the question of leadership and made the following critical statement: "After a correct political line has been worked out and tested in practice, the Party cadres become the decisive force in the leadership. . . . A correct political line is of course the primary and most important thing."[16]

Let us now draw some conclusions about Leninist organization as a novel form of charisma—an instance of charismatic impersonality.

1. Both Leninism and Nazism are in crucial respects instances of heroically oriented responses to the class order developments of Western Europe.
2. Both Lenin and Stalin possessed personal charisma, and, particularly during Stalin's rule, the leader threatened the Party as the primary locus of charisma.
3. Even under Stalin the emphasis on the leader and cadres—at least in formal and ideal terms—always remained subordinate to the Party as the agent capable of formulating a

14. J. V. Stalin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (Bolshevik), June 27, 1930," in J. V. Stalin, *Works*, vol. 12 (April 1929–June 1930) (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955; reprinted by Red Star Press, London, n.d.).
15. More properly, "neo-sultanism," a variant of a neopatrimonial political order in which the leader's personal (political) discretion is the political system's defining feature. Max Weber discusses the sultanist variant of patrimonialism in *Economy and Society*, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 1: 231–32.
16. J. V. Stalin, "Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU (Bolshevik) On the Work of the Central Committee," in *The Essential Stalin*, ed. Bruce Franklin (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), pp. 373–74.

correct line, a program separate from the personal insight of the leader.

4. The emphasis on the primacy of a correct line strongly suggests that even when minor or latent, the charismatic impersonalism of the Party is an integral/defining component of Leninism that is constantly available in a formal sense—and intermittently available in a political sense—as a legitimate basis for countering tendencies toward führerism. The 20th Party Congress is the most striking, but by no means the only, illustration of this point.
5. It is misleading to distinguish between charismatic and ideological movements à la Nyomarkey. Rather, one can distinguish different types of charismatic movements, with Leninism being one and Nazism another. The leader is charismatic in Nazism; the program and (possibly) the leader are charismatic in Leninism.[17]

The importance of the notion of the correct line in Leninism is that it is not a typical Party program. Instead, it parallels the organizational character of the Party, itself an amalgam of modern and charismatic elements. The "correct line" is simultaneously an analytic and empirical statement of the stages of national and international development, a set of policy guides, and an authoritatively compelling and exclusive ideological-political statement that must be adopted and adhered to.

In the "correct line," one has a striking contemporary instance of a modern program encompassed and understood in neosacral terms. Clearly, at different points in the developmental history of Leninist regimes, the empirical-impersonal elements have been severely constrained. Gulag, Lysenko, and "Dizzy with Success" cannot, should not, and do not have to be

17. There is a constant tendency in Leninism toward strong executive leaders. This is not the same as a constant tendency toward the emergence of a charismatic leader, as in the case in Nazism, fascism, or war bands. I would argue that it is possible to specify the developmental points at which the emergence of charismatic leadership in Leninist regimes is likely and when there is likely to be an attempt on the part of the Party elite to create a charismatic aura around a leader (a related but different phenomenon than the emergence of a charismatic leader).

ignored to sustain the argument that Leninism is a conflictual, but effective, amalgam of charismatic impersonalism.

Lenin recast the mutually exclusive elements of individual heroism and impersonal modern organization in creating a "party of a new type." This party combined heroism and impersonalism, charismatic arbitrariness (i.e., antipathy toward rational procedures and calculations) and sober empirical examination of social change. No better formal expression of this novel amalgam can be found than the notion of the "correct line." However, the striking differences in the weighting and definition of charismatic and modern elements in the Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev regimes make clear the need for a synthetic statement of the constants and variables in the syndrome of Leninist charismatic organization.

One can identify charismatic and modern imperatives in Leninist parties and regimes. These imperatives are constant and conflictual. They provide for a continuously recognizable identity alongside the historically varying and developmentally related features of Leninist organization.[18] On the charismatic side, there is the concept of the working class, cadres, and Party as heroic elements. In particular, the Party is called on to sacrifice, struggle, and exercise continual vigilance to maintain its purpose and commitment to the realization of historical laws of social development that are conceived in teleological and universal terms. On the modern side, there is a materialist orientation that (with varying degrees of effectiveness but undeniable persistence) calls for an empirical, undogmatic examination of social change and organization, as well as for the collective discussion of social issues.

In contrast to the constant elements of Leninism, there are variables whose identification can explain the changes in the

18. To suggest the existence of organizational constants in Leninism is not to assert their "Platonic" imperviousness to the national and international environments with which Leninist regimes interact. Rather, the emphasis on the existence of organizationally constant imperatives directs one's attention to the types of situations Leninist regimes are likely to avoid, resist, and/or be unwilling/unable to adapt to. For a most impressive analysis of a nation's adaptation within the framework of ideological constants, see Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955), passim.

institutional facade, policies, and ideological emphases that mark the developmental profile of Leninist regimes. Two are of particular importance. The first I term *developmental tasks.* For current purposes, it is crucial to understand that a Leninist elite's adoption of a specific task causes particular types of political uncertainties and, consequently, particular types of regime structures to manage those uncertainties.[19] These regime structures vary in terms of the relative power held by the Party leader and by the Party's central organs, the relative status of the Party vis-à-vis police and military institutions, the distinctive competence of the cadres recruited (i.e., in risk-taking, coercion, or social management), and the status of ideology, from that of partisan empirical instrument to that of a stereotyped or dogmatic conception of reality.

The second variable is the *sociocultural milieu* within which a Leninist party and regime operates. Whether, to what extent, and in which areas a society is primarily status- or class-oriented and organized will significantly shape the way in which Leninist leadership is expressed, policies are implemented, authority is interpreted, and so on.

To summarize: The profile of a Leninist regime at any given point reflects both the interplay of organizational constants—charismatic (heroic) and modern (materialist) elements—and of these constant conflictual imperatives with varying developmental tasks and changes in the sociocultural configuration of the society being acted upon. To point out the complexity of this relationship would be trite. Whether a phenomenon is simple or complex is rarely the crucial consideration. It is whether we can make the phenomenon intelligible. The terms and mode of analysis presented here increase that possibility, if in no other way than by not confusing organizationally constant with developmentally specific elements in the Leninist syndrome.[20]

19. See chapters 3 and 5.

20. While valuable in other respects, both Richard Lowenthal's "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," in *Change in Communist Systems,* ed. Chalmers Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 83–117, and Robert C. Tucker's "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," in Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea,* pp. 172–215, contribute to this confusion. (Along with my criticism of these two works, I very readily acknowledge how much Lowenthal and Tucker have shaped my own interests.) Other influential studies in the field present a unidimensional or "collapsed" view of development in Soviet and Soviet-type regimes—for example, Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society,* ed. S. P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 3–48, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" in *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics,* ed. Brzezinski (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 1–35.

One highly signficant aspect of Leninism as a type of charismatic organization remains to be examined—that is, its status or traditional features. Once this is done, we shall have a more complete grasp of Leninism as an effective institutional substitute in some peasant countries with a nonfeudal legacy for the type of class organization and identification that emerged in nineteenth-century western Europe—a substitute that in certain respects "fits" and in others attacks the institutional and cultural profile of a status society.

To develop an argument about the status or traditional features of Leninist charismatic organization requires a summation and extension of Max Weber's observations about the relationship between tradition and charisma. According to Weber, charisma and tradition are fundamentally antithetical. Charisma calls for revolution; tradition, for conservation. However, in certain formal respects, traditional and charismatic orientations are similar, given their stress on personal (not abstract) and substantive (not formal) considerations. Both forms of social action are "hostile" to the impersonal-rational calculation that typifies modern organization. In Weber's words, "the two basically antagonistic forces of charisma and tradition regularly merge with one another; . . . the external forms of the two structures of domination are . . . often similar to the point of being identical."[21]

Identifying the formal overlap that exists between charismatic and status (or traditional) orientations is an important step in coming to grips with the ability of Leninism to operate effectively in a peasant-status milieu, but it is inadequate alone. Two other aspects of the charisma-tradition relationship—which to the best of my knowledge Weber did not develop—are

21. Weber, *Economy and Society,* vol. 3, esp. p. 1122.

highly consequential for a charismatic leader's (or organization's) political effectiveness. First, charismatic leaders or organizations gain entry into the very societies they wish to destroy and transform by possessing traditional features that are formally congruent with certain facets of a peasant-status society. (I enumerate these features below.) A charismatic leader is unlikely to get the majority of a society to adhere to his vision for the simple reason that, by definition, his vision is revolutionary and entails fundamental revisions in the identity and organization of individuals and groups. Yet charismatic leaders have adherents. The standard explanation from Weber through Karl Deutsch has focused on social mobilization and turbulence.[22] A society subject to serious disruption, stress, and uncertainty creates a pool of persons available for recommitment. This is a valuable and empirically confirmable point; however, there is more to it. What makes the charismatic effective is not only the availability of socially mobilized clusters, but also the charismatic leader's (and/or organization's) possession of qualities that, at least in a formal or structural sense, are consistent with the defining features of the society to be transformed. It is the possession of these features that gives the charismatic entry into the society he or she wishes to change.

Let us refer to the examples of charisma discussed earlier: Christ lived at a time of great turmoil (i.e., social mobilization) in Israel, but it was his status as a rabbi and student of Mosaic law that made him intelligible to others, gained him an audience, and gave him a toehold in the society he wished to transform. It was Hitler's patriotic participation in the German army in World War I and his credentials as a German nationalist and supporter of the German army that provided him with a base in a society that he wished to transform in ways that many a nationalist would come to rue.

Lenin's case would appear to be more difficult to interpret in these terms. He was by no stretch of the imagination a Russian nationalist (as, in a peculiar fashion, Stalin was). But he did present himself in terms intelligible to a "mobilized" Russian

22. See Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 55, no. 3 (September 1961): 493–514.

audience. Not only was he considered "the old man" by his followers, but his self-presentation in critical respects obviously conformed to that role, as did his more general disposition, which Wilson captures with his notion of Lenin the headmaster. Wilson's comment that Lenin "had to have loyal adherents, with whom he could actually work . . . and [that] there appeared in his relation to his group something of the attitude of the older brother, carried over from his relation to his family, and a good deal of the inspired schoolmaster"[23] suggests that while Lenin was no Russian nationalist, he was—in identifiable sociocultural respects—a Russian.

Second, a charismatic's traditional features mediate between an organization with revolutionary commitments and its need to recruit members from a population that, even if socially mobilized, still culturally orients itself in terms of status (or traditional) orientations and expectations.[24] When Lenin said, "We can (and must) begin to build socialism, not with abstract human material, or with human material specially prepared by us, but with the human material bequeathed to us by capitalism,"[25] he might also have observed that the distinctiveness of his party's organization and orientation was its ability (under certain conditions) to offer itself as an intelligible medium for the recruitment and transformation of that "imperfect" material.

A case in point and one that can be used to demonstrate the utility of looking at the relationship between charisma and tradition in the terms we have devised is the success of the Chinese Communist Party in recruiting adherents during the Japanese invasion.

In his important works on peasant nationalism, Chalmers Johnson has argued that there was a direct relationship be-

23. Wilson, *To the Finland Station*, p. 390.

24. Too often it is uncritically assumed that to be uprooted from an institutional setting is to be stripped of one's cultural orientations. A distinction should be made between social and cultural mobilization. Typically, the latter lags behind the former. The difference in the extent of social and cultural mobilization within a given group may have a direct bearing on the types of organizations and appeals that are politically effective with that group.

25. V. I. Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism—An Infantile Disorder," in V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966), vol. 31 (April–December 1920), p. 50.

tween the social mobilization of Chinese peasants and the consequent opportunity for the Chinese Communist Party to provide uprooted peasants with new national-political identities. I suggest this relationship is stated a bit mechanically. In light of my argument about the relationship between charisma and tradition, I would hypothesize that in a situation of intense social disruption, the Chinese Communist Party was successful in recruiting large numbers of adherents in part because, as an organization, it contained a number of features at least formally or structurally congruent with a number of the defining features of a peasant-status society. The formal status features of the Chinese Communist Party's Leninist organization mediated between its charismatic-revolutionary and national commitments and the status orientations of the socially mobilized mass base from which it had to recruit.[26]

It is now possible to provide a final characterization of Leninism: The distinctive quality of Leninist organization is the enmeshment of status (traditional) and class (modern) elements in the framework of an impersonal-charismatic organization.

The statuslike features (that at times are so consequential as mediating elements in the process of recruitment) include the following: (a) a marked tendency to distinguish between insiders (i.e., members of the Party) and outsiders; (b) an emphasis on the security and protection of belonging to a closed, well-bounded group; and (c) a placement of power in the hands of cadres whose central personal role is emphasized—particularly during the initial developmental phases of Leninist regimes.

These statuslike features, I have hypothesized, make a Leninist party intelligible to some sectors of a peasant population. They do not necessarily or automatically make it politically acceptable or influential. Its influence depends, not on the formal correspondence of certain of its features with those of peasant

26. See Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), passim, and "Peasant Nationalism Revisited: The Biography of a Book," *China Quarterly* 72 (December 1977), p. 774. Obviously, the Party's mediating role was more central to those peasants who joined the Party than to the larger number of nonparty peasant soldiers and followers, who probably held a more complicated view of national identity than Johnson suggests.

society, but on the level of social mobilization in a society, and on whether there exist rival radical organizations whose substantive commitments are more aligned with those of a peasant population. To take the Romanian case as one in point: nativist nationalist movements of a charismatic order, such as the Iron Guard, in addition to an organizational format consistent with peasant orientations, had a set of substantive (religious and cultural) commitments closely related to the peasants' own; thus membership in a group like the Iron Guard involved much less of an identity shift for a peasant than if he were to join the Communist Party, with its materialist (modern) emphases.[27]

This discussion leads us to a fundamental hypothesis: Leninism's novelty as a political organization lies in significant measure in the fact that its traditional features are more structural than substantive in nature. One test of this hypothesis is that peasants who are recruited into a Leninist party should initially find much of its organization and orientation intelligible rather than alien. But after joining, they should become aware of organizational features of a substantive order that not only do not coincide with peasant social organization and orientation, but also actively oppose them. As we shall see below, there is supportive evidence for this hypothesis.[28]

The organizational features of Leninism that oppose peasant social organization are the Party's class or modern commitments. They include an emphasis on the individual responsibility of members for the execution of tasks, achievement as a central criterion for mobility and recognition, and—consequent on the relationship between personal effort and organizational-social mobility—the development of a sense of personal-individual efficacy and control over events. The Party also emphasizes a more empirical, less magical appreciation of social and political problems. In fact, the argument can be made that in societies and cultures where personal, discrete, and ritualistic orientations predominate, the potential significance and power of "sci-

27. For those interested in the Romanian case, I develop this point in Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944–65* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 85–89.

28. For example, Lucian Pye's interviews with Malayan ex-guerrillas (Pye, *Guerilla Communism in Malaya* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956]).

entific socialism" are precisely in the emphasis it places on empirical, abstract, and critical modes of investigation of and orientation to social phenomena. Thus Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea's repeated emphasis that neo-serfdom was a systemic phenomenon—not the result of individually evil landlords—was a cultural break of epistemological and ontological proportions insufficient to bring about a social revolution but a significant component of such.

To stop at the point where one identifies a set of modern action orientations in the Leninist concept of organization and membership would be premature, misleading, and inconsistent with the theoretical approach of this work, however. To capture the distinctive quality of the class or modern features of Leninist parties and regimes, one has to specify their definition at an institutional—not social-action—level. It is the enmeshment of modern (and traditional) orientations in a novel type of charismatic framework that detemines the manner in which these modern action orientations express themselves. The charismatically impersonal features of Leninist organization are not simply neutral auspices under which modern developments of a Western liberal order occur. Rather, they constrain and shape the modes of modern or class developments. Thus individualism is expressed in the neocorporate unit of the collective (i.e., Party cell, work collective); achievement as a premise and imperative is in continual tension with the charismatic premise of Party membership as a heroic intrinsic quality; and scientific socialism as an emphasis on empirical, abstract, and critical orientations conflicts with the conception of scientific socialism as a grasp of inexorable, universal, and unilinear historical laws.

The Leninist Party and regime constitute a novel package of charismatic, traditional, and modern elements, a recasting of the definition and relation of these three elements in such a way that the Party combines impersonal and affective elements[29]

29. In this sense, the Leninist party can be seen as the formal organizational equivalent of Japanese social organization. As spelled out by Nakane, the distinctiveness of Japanese social organization rests on the fusion of affective and hierarchical-organizational elements. Unlike other peasant societies, in traditional Japanese society, the organization, not the family, has been the object of identity and loyalty (see Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970], esp. pp. 1–7 and 40–63).

and appeals effectively, if not logically, to some persons and groups in a turbulent society who themselves are a composite of heroic, status, and secular orientations.[30]

Is there any empirical support for the argument that Leninism's novelty lies in its recasting of status and class elements under impersonal-charismatic auspices? At the elite level, support for this argument comes from an examination of Ho Chi Minh's attraction to Leninism. At the mass level, there are interview data from Lucian Pye's seminal (and for some reason largely forgotten) study of Malayan ex-guerrillas.

From Ho Chi Minh's various statements about Leninism, one can identify a set of central perceptions. First, one is struck by Ho's admiration for Lenin.[31] This admiration is significant in two respects. To begin with, there was the traditional—and in this case mediating—dimension of Ho's seeing Lenin as a political "elder" and hero. Subsequently, Ho's personal admiration of Lenin developed into an appreciation of the novel quality of heroism in Leninism—its incorporation of impersonal and empirical orientations. In an article for *Pravda* entitled "Leninism and the Liberation of Oppressed Peoples," Ho identified Lenin's contribution as twofold:

> Lenin helped the working people . . . to realize in a more comprehensive manner the laws of social development, the requirements

30. Three considerations are relevant in connection with the reference to "some persons and groups": (1) The number of people in a peasant society both institutionally uprooted and (for whatever reasons) oriented to empirical, analytic, and impersonal conceptions and practices is likely to be relatively small. (2) These people are not simply peasants, but rather "composites" of status, charismatic, and secular orientations. In most cases they are the products of a peasant milieu, and (with exceptions) they are less mobilized culturally than socially. (3) The majority of those adhering to the Party at any given time is unlikely to be the "composite" type I refer to. For the majority, the decision to join the Party is likely to be based more on the absence of alternatives, decisions made by "significant others," career considerations, and so on. "Composite" types are more likely to be found within the influential cadre stratum. Pye, Hinton (*Fanshen* [New York: Vintage Books, 1966]), and Burks (*The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961]) provide data that support this suggestion.

31. Bernard B. Fall, ed., *Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920–66* (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 23–24, 39–40, 61–62.

> and objective conditions of the political struggle in every stage of the . . . revolution. . . . He gave [the oppressed masses] the miraculous weapon to fight for their emanicipation—the theory and tactics of Bolshevism.[32]

In Ho's eyes, Lenin had created an organization—the Bolshevik party—that combined the heroic (i.e., the "miraculous weapon") and the scientific (i.e., the "laws of social development"). It was this novel recasting of familiar appeals in substantively new formats and of unfamiliar appeals in formally familiar guises that distinguished Leninism. For example, heroism (a familiar appeal) was related to an impersonal-formal organization (an unfamiliar format), while ideological support of anticolonialism, national equality, and political activism for the masses (unfamiliar appeals) were related to an authoritarian organization with a charismatic leader (a familiar format). It was this novel recasting that appealed to those like Ho who were themselves composites of status, charismatic, and secular orientations.

Ho saw Lenin as the "great leader [who] after having liberated his own people wanted to liberate other peoples, too." But he also saw that Lenin, unlike a traditional "big man," had "mapped out a definite program" to reach his goals.[33] And this program was ideally based as much on empirical analysis and critical theory as on conventional observation or inspiration. In short, for Ho, Lenin was a "big man," but a "big man of a new type."

To be sure, this is not an exhaustive explanation of Ho Chi Minh's commitment to Leninism, and it is a single case. But it is a highly significant case, and the fit between my identification of what is novel in Leninism and Ho's perception of Leninism's distinctiveness is not forced.

At the mass level, Pye's interview data from Malayan ex-guerrillas are remarkably consistent with my argument about Leninism. (That these findings have not been given the sustained attention they deserve is probably in part because of the absence of a conceptual statement about Leninism that would indicate their general significance.) According to Pye:

32. Ibid., pp. 255–56.
33. Ibid., p. 39.

> In contrast to the impersonal relations of the . . . competitive labor market that had threatened [the ex-guerrillas'] sense of security before they joined the party, they felt that they had discovered in Communism the highly personal relations they craved, [but] they learned that behind the facade of personal intimacy lay the impersonal rationale of the party. . . . They discovered that in actual fact they were socially isolated within the party.[34]

In his very interesting discussion of comradeship and friendship in China, Ezra Vogel also supports my notion of the Party as a substitute form of impersonality—a charismatic impersonalism of discipline and affectivity.[35] Vogel's purpose is "to explore the decline of friendliness and the rise of comradeship."[36] The exploration comes up with the following discoveries. First, comradeship as a form of social interaction is more limited than friendship, engaging less of the total personality. It is more impersonal and formal—that is, ideally it is oriented to impersonal roles, not their incumbents. It involves the creation of a standardized public mode of interaction between equals, in contrast to unique relations among bounded groups of friends. In short, comradeship is a form of social market where the "goods"—that is, persons (rather than commodities)—are interchangeable, thereby increasing the combinatorial freedom and level of power available to the Party and state.

Second, the means used by the Chinese Communist Party to foster comradeship over friendship were to increase the fear of confiding too closely in one's friends; the Party did so by creating mutual distrust and consequent social distance. Emotion and affect were to be redirected toward the Party and away from one's social acquaintances and personal friends. How different this sounds from the descriptions by Western social scientists of the capacity for mutual trust that was supposedly such

34. Pye, *Guerilla Communism,* pp. 279–80; see also pp. 311–14.
35. Ezra Vogel, "From Friendship to Comradeship: The Change in Personal Relations in Communist China," *China Quarterly* 21 (January–March 1965): 1–28.
36. Ibid., p. 46. The language used below in summarizing Vogel's argument is my own. Vogel does not refer to a "standarized public mode of interaction," "social markets," or "combinatorial power." However, I do not think this language is inconsistent with the meaning of his argument.

an integral part of the West's unique developmental accomplishments! But was it? Certainly if one gives some weight to the role of Calvinism as a mode of social organization and orientation in the development of Western capitalism, one has to think twice. Calvinism argues adamantly for trust in God (equivalent to the Leninist party), but according to Max Weber, "especially in the English Puritan literature [Calvinism argues] against any trust in the aid or friendship of men."[37] In both the English and Chinese cases, the significance of such a social orientation in a status society based on corporate identity is clear and revolutionary. It creates "isolated" individuals, undermines the integrity of corporate social organization, and substitutes impersonal frames of reference that coordinate and standardize the actions of diverse people. Not trust, but impersonal, common organizational frames of reference are integral parts of modern development.[38] The Leninist and liberal modes differ significantly precisely with respect to the auspices under which the new mode of impersonalism developed. In the English case, impersonalism as an authoritative public norm developed in good measure (though by no means exclusively) through an internalized voluntary charismatic ideology, while in the Chinese and other Leninist cases, it has developed through the authoritative imposition of a charismatic organization.[39]

There is additional information from Pye's Malayan study

37. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Scribner's, 1958), p. 106.

38. There is some empirical support for this contention. In *Becoming Modern* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), Alex Inkeles notes that "there were some personal attributes which the theory . . . had identified as presumably part of the syndrome of individual modernity, but which nevertheless failed to legitimate their claim in our empirical investigation. . . . For example, modern men evidently are not outstanding in trust" (p. 117).

39. As Max Weber noted about the creation of industries, "The mercantilistic regulations of the State might develop industries, but not, or certainly not alone, the spirit of capitalism; where they assumed a despotic authoritarian character, they to a large extent directly hindered it. . . . Thus a similar effect might well have resulted from ecclesiastical regimentation when it became excessively despotic. It enforced a particular type of external conformity, but in some cases weakened the subjective motives of rational conduct" (*Protestant Ethic*, p. 152). Analogously, there are different routes to a class society based on the individual and impersonal norms of action, but different routes ensure that class societies will vary in ethos and operation.

about the combining and recasting within the Party of traditional and modern elements under the auspices of a charismatic-heroic organization. Pye's interviews suggested to him that for many ex-guerrillas, the Party was a route (the first in their experience) to mobility based on personal achievement, a route that gave them a sense of individual efficacy.[40] At the same time, they found the hierarchical organization of the Party quite consistent with their previous social and cultural experiences. However, they ran into confusion when they came up against the distinctive features of Leninist organization—charismatic impersonalism. The ex-guerrillas responded to the personal authority of leading cadres in quite traditional terms, but they were often perplexed when cadres with whom they had formed what they thought to be typical status-personal relations criticized them for not having achieved certain organizational goals and even purged them on this basis.

While no comparable empirical studies of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) have been undertaken, a partial "substitute" for such may be found in an organizational comparison with the other Romanian revolutionary movement during the interwar period—the Iron Guard. Both the Guard and the Party emphasized hierarchy and discipline of cadres. Both attempted to insulate their cadres from the contaminating effects of society. Both had supranational referents—one religious, the other ideological. Both argued the need for fundamental cultural transformation, not simply elite change.

Eugen Weber, who has written the most sophisticated analyses of interwar Romania, has suggested that for both the right and the left, "the sources of dissatisfaction were similar, the radical conclusions were similar, only the directions in which people follow their conclusions were different, and even these were essentially a combination of populism and sectarian elitism."[41] Similarities between the Iron Guard and the Party did exist; however, what Weber describes as "only the directions" is exactly

40. Pye, *Guerilla Communism*, pp. 316, 318.

41. Eugen Weber: "The Men of the Archangel," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 1 (1966): 124; and see id., "Romania," in *The European Right*, ed. Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 501–75.

where the qualitative differences between the Guard and Party lay.

For the Guard, a charismatic leader was the central ideological feature, both in theory and in practice; not so for the Party. In the Guard, songs were favored over speeches—that is, the Guard's emphasis was on form, externality, ritual, and magic, while the Party's was a more analytic orientation to social issues. In the Guard, men counted and programs were disdained; in the Party, the emphasis on cadres was integrally related to the formulation of a "correct line."[42] The Guard's symbolic references were the king and people—an almost paradigmatic status relationship (personal and hierarchical).[43] The Party's major

42. As is well known, the line was anything but "correct" in many respects. The Romanian Party's line was authoritatively set by Stalin, often in ignorance of Romanian conditions and without regard for the Romanian Party's own political interests. While significant for certain issues, this point is relevant at a different level of analysis and does not contradict the one I am making in my comparison of the Romanian CP and the Iron Guard.

43. The usual comparative reference for the Iron Guard movement has been European fascism (though Eugen Weber has suggestively pointed to the millenarian-syncretist movements of sub-Saharan Africa for comparison). I suggest that the Guard might be more fruitfully compared with the Moslem Brotherhood movement in Egypt during the interwar period. The points of similarity are impressive. Both movements were dependent on a charismatic leader (Codreanu for the Guard and al-Banna for the Brotherhood), and neither ever really recovered after that leader's death. Both movements were embedded in religious idioms and frameworks, each reflecting the different content of the respective religions; for example, one does not find in the Brotherhood the emphasis on death that there was in the Guard. Both emphasized absolute discipline and obedience without any pretext of criticism/self-criticism or "debate before obedience." Both demonstrated a reluctance to take power (at least until Codreanu's death in the case of the Guard), and never effectively resolved their "educative" orientation with that of programmatic leadership. The revolutionary thrust of both movements was deflected by their allegiance to the king, and both were consequently disarmed quite easily. Both defined membership and organization in a fashion that emphasized affective-personal allegiances rather than affective-impersonal ones—a limited but interesting indication being the Brotherhood's designation of its membership units as *usra*, a term highly congruent with the Guard's use of the term *nest*. In the composition of both movements, one sees the predominance of the same social types—particularly at the elite-activist levels. Students, clerks, civil servants, and teachers are found in large numbers—"those who had passed through varying degrees of Westernization and had already accepted some of its premises," but who for material and ideal reasons were still attached to traditional religious and cultural frames of reference. Similarities in the respective positions and roles of Premier Brătianu in Romania and Zaghlul in Egypt, the Liberal Party and Wafd, the position of the monarchy in each country, the role of the army and that of the Great Powers—all add structural plausibility to a comparative study. (On the Moslem Brotherhood, see in particular Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* [London: Oxford University Press, 1969], passim. On the Guard, see the references in E. Weber: "The Men of the Archangel" and "Romania.")

referent was class. Even the terms for the basic membership units in each organization highlight the parties' different characters (ethos as much as structure): in the Guard, the basic unit was the "nest"; in the Party, the "cell."

What emerges from these contrasts between the Guard and the Party is the difference in quality—not degree—that characterizes Leninism as a "direction" or response to conditions in a dependent peasant country.

There is another major element of Leninism, along with its substitution of charismatic for procedural impersonalism and its recasting of status and class features under charismatic organizational auspices. Leninism as a mode of analysis and strategy is based on an "ingenious error."

In his *General Economic History*, Max Weber refers to the "old truth . . . that an ingenious error is more fruitful for science than stupid accuracy."[44] With due modification, one could argue that Leninism as a particular approach to social change in a peasant country is founded on an "ingenious error." This error is the incorrect extrapolation of certain social distinctions from the economic differentiation Leninists observe in peasant society.

It was Joseph Schumpeter who pointed out the reductionist synthesis in Marxism of social and economic elements. Schumpeter argued for the autonomy of the social dimension and for recognizing the social character of classes. For him, classes were made up of families, not atomized individuals whose life chances were determined by their relation to the means of production.[45]

Teodor Shanin's study of the Russian peasant village extends and confirms, so to speak, Schumpeter's conception of social organization. Shanin found that Russian villages at the time of

44. Max Weber, *General Economic History* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), p. 30.

45. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 9–20.

collectivization were vertically integrated units in which economic differentials existed but were not the primary dimension along which a community was organized.[46] Rather, a village community was made up of peasant family households that experienced generational cyclical mobility—a phenomenon that favored vertical integration rather than class antagonism. Shanin's description of Russian villagers united around the village kulaks in opposition to the *kombedy* and Red Army very much resembles the recent solidary village responses to efforts at *vijijini ujamaa* (collectivization) in Tanzania.[47]

In short, theoretical argument and empirical investigation seem to support the populist-nationalist idea that in peasant society, economic differences do not signify that class is the primary basis of identification and conflict. The Leninist analysis of village organization is in error—not in pointing to social distinctions, but in conceiving them to be class (rather than

46. Teodor Shanin, *The Awkward Class* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), passim.

47. *Kombedy* were committees of poor peasants. The original *kombedy* movement occurred during the Russian Civil War. The committees were revitalized during collectivization. In *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (New York: Vintage Russian Library, 1958), Merle Fainsod provides some data on the tendency of poor and middle peasants to unite with kulaks against the regime's collectivization efforts: "Of the 122 persons who were apprehended in October (1929, the Western Oblast) for committing 'terrorist' acts, approximately half were kulaks and well to do peasants, and another 45% were middle and poor peasants. The latter group, observed the procurator, was closely allied with the kulak elements by 'family and economic ties' and still manifested a 'petty-bourgeois' ideology" (p. 241). On the response to collectivization in Dodoma, Tanzania, see Frances Hill, "Ujamaa: African Socialist Productionism in Tanzania," in *Socialism in the Third World,* eds. Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque (New York: Praeger, 1975), esp. pp. 237–45. Hill stresses that "those with little land were as insistent [i.e., opposed to collectivization] as those with more to lose" (p. 241). On the other hand, Issa G. Shivji, a Leninist, holds to the expected position that in Iringa, another region in Tanzania where collectivization was opposed, "the poor and the middle peasants remain politically dominated and economically exploited" (*Class Struggles in Tanzania* [New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976], p. 108). It is true that Iringa is economically more developed than Dodoma. However, I remain skeptical that even in Iringa the peasants see themselves primarily in economic class and exploitation terms. That there are tensions and conflicts in Iringa and Dodoma and in every peasant region is obvious to anyone who has had occasion to observe village life. To invariably interpret them in economic class terms can be misleading.

status) distinctions. But the error—murderous in the Soviet case for several reasons, including the fact that much time had elapsed between land reform and collectivization, and the fact that land reform itself had not been accomplished by a regime with a strong rural Party apparatus (as in China)[48]—is "ingenious." The ideological-conceptual map with which Leninists work leads them to see economic differences as evidence of social polarization and the existence of "class allies" in the villages, and it enables them to do politically what nationalists can do only analytically—that is, distinguish and oppose competing social bases and conceptions of the nation-state (e.g., working-class versus middle-class nation). Working with such a paradigm, Leninists attack the institutional bases, not simply the elite organization, of peasant society.

The Leninist "error" leads to collectivization—an attack on the sociocultural bases of peasant institutional life, not (simply) to land reform—an attack on the political economy of elite organization in a peasant society.[49] The "right" targets are attacked for the "wrong" reasons. Not simply elites, but the basic institutions of a status society—the peasant corporate household and the village community—are broken through—not eliminated, but decisively transformed and given new roles in the social, economic, and political order.

An attack on institutions is the condition for breaking out of the pattern of "arrested development" characteristic of peasant countries.[50] In communist countries, the attack has typically

48. On China's land reform, Thomas P. Bernstein, "Leadership and Mass Mobilization in the Soviet and Chinese Collectivization Campaigns of 1929–1930 and 1955–1956: A Comparison," *China Quarterly* 31 (July–September 1967): 1–47.

49. David Mitrany's *Marx against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism* (New York: Collier Books, 1961) has long been considered a classic analysis of Leninism's relation to the peasantry. Yet in light of our discussion of the Leninist response to agrarian society, Mitrany's observations take on quite different meanings from those he assigns to his remarks about Leninism's artificial relationship to the revolutionary process in China and Eastern Europe and from what he considers to be Marxism's unnecessary and misguided opposition to the peasants.

50. My thesis is that any successful attempt decisively to change the structure and ethos of a peasant-status society depends on institutional, not simply elite, change. Leninism is one ideological-organizational and strategic means

taken the form of substituting organizational for social elites and formal organizations (e.g., the collectives) for social modes of economic production (e.g., the peasant village household). Organizational cadres do not necessarily displace village status figures ("big men," "patrons," "patriarchs") from affective and informal roles, but they do replace them in authoritative (political and economic) roles. Similarly, the collectives undermine the peasant households and village communities as institutions and models of social, economic, and political power more than as work units or informal social referents. The kulak is not an alien in the village who is seen primarily as an economic exploiter; he is a key figure in the corporate household and village system of social identification, organization, and power. Leninism errs in its understanding of his character and role, but it does so in a way that leads to strategies and policies that undermine the kulak, the peasant household, and the village community as defining institutions in a peasant-status society.

In historical retrospect, it might well be argued that, taken on a grand scale, the distinctive feature of Leninist programs of social change has been the substitution of the individual for the corporate group as the social and cultural base of social action and identification, and that this feat was accomplished by replacing the peasant household with the peasant nuclear family through collectivization (and accompanying industrialization and education).

That in communist countries the institutional expression of individualism differs significantly from its Western counterpart is predictable in terms of our analysis. The point here is that collectivization as the strategic manifestation of Lenin's "ingenious error" has a sociocultural as well as an economic significance.

The proverbial wisdom about collectivization is well illustrated by a comment by Zbigniew Brzezinski that Leninism is inapplicable to African conditions. According to Brzezinski, "a continuing Communist problem is the universal Communist failure in the agricultural sector, a failure that becomes espe-

of doing this in peasant societies at certain levels of social and economic development.

cially embarrassing in dealing with a continent that is primarily agrarian."[51] Brzezinski's error is far from ingenious. He has confused agricultural and agrarian problems—or, in the terms used in this analysis, political-economic with sociocultural problems.[52]

Collectivization is more than an effort to undermine landlords and kulaks economically and politically; it is more than an effort to industrialize. It is an attack on the social institutions and cultural orientations of peasant society. To quote Henry Roberts on the Romanian land reform of 1945: "The Communists undoubtedly exaggerated the economic importance of the boyars and the extent of their holdings. Nevertheless, a certain boyar spirit still prevailed in Rumania and the fact of land ownership continued to be a mark of prestige."[53]

Nothing that has been said thus far is meant to imply that Leninism and collectivization (industrialization) are the only means of bringing about significant changes in a peasant country. The reformist political economy analyses and strategies of Nikolai Bukharin, Kemal Atatürk, Indira Gandhi, or the Ford Foundation *do* significantly alter the social organization of a peasant country. Reformist strategies *do* seriously modify the character of the peasant household through commercialization and *do* bring about major revisions in the state's role.[54] However, these strategies tend to be more sectoral than national in application (if not in rhetoric) and generally more oriented to changes in elite than in institutional patterns.[55] The neomer-

51. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Conclusion: The African Challenge," in *Africa and the Communist World,* ed. Brzezinski (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 210.

52. Interestingly enough, a Danish expert called to Romania in the interwar period to review its rural problems emphasized that the problems were agrarian rather than agricultural (see Henry Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951], p. 63).

53. Ibid., p. 299.

54. In this connection, see Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), chs. 5–8. The example of India is even more striking.

55. The difference between regimes that initiate some type of land reform and those that follow collectivization-industrialization is quite striking with regard to the effective penetration and integration of the rural areas with the

cantilist state-society that emerges from such changes continues to be based on a highly personalistic, stereotyped, and fragmented division of labor. Because of the absence of a nationally effective framework of impersonal norms that institutionally standardize human and economic resources, thereby allowing for their greater mobility and interchange, there is a high degree of (social) resource immobilization and fragmentation.

It is important to recognize that with Leninist modes of development there are also stereotyping and immobilization of certain types of resources at points in their developmental history, and in some respects unintentional reinforcement of certain status orientations among the population.[56] The differences between a reformist political-economy approach and a revolutionary sociocultural one are not absolute. But an observation of this order tends to be more placating than discriminating: while the differences are not absolute, they are basic. The two types of strategies differ in their impact on the central units of a peasant society—the extended household and village. Specifically, they differ in their ability to incorporate these units into a national political framework effectively based on impersonal norms of social action. The accomplishment of Leninism in a peasant society is that it authoritatively establishes a charismatic (not legal) type of impersonal institutional framework at all levels and in all sectors of society.

Developments during the NEP period in the Soviet Union highlight the relative incapacity of a reformist political-economy approach decisively to recast a status society into a class society.

Bukharin, the leading proponent of what is here referred to as a reformist or political-economy view, failed to see (as Robert Pethybridge has so correctly noted) that under the auspices of the NEP, Nepmen, kulaks, and *kustarnyi,* far from "growing into" socialism, were successfully using the new organizational formats introduced by the Party to expand and protect the social and cultural features of a kin-based, notable-ruled, corporately

urban (see Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development,* pp. 7–69).

56. I examine this process in Romania and attempt to conceptualize it in chapter 2.

organized social order.[57] Bukharin held that owing to the changes in the rural elite brought about by land reform, the urban sector (the cities) could act as "commanding heights" for the rural areas; this notion was put to the test and came up short.

Gregory Massell's study of Soviet transformation efforts in Central Asia during the 1920s provides striking evidence of the Sisyphus-like quality of social-change strategies in a peasant country that emphasizes elite reorganization more than institutional transformation. According to Massell, "it would appear that the separation of traditional leaders from their followers, even when successfully carried out . . . did not . . . automatically lead to a community's dissolution."[58] Massell relates this observation to the segmentary character of social organization in the area, and goes on to note that under the circumstances

> valued lines of kin could serve as vehicles to fill whatever gaps there were. In effect, it is probable that ANY locally respected and strategically connected patriarch . . . could step into the place of lost traditional leaders. . . . It is also likely that heads of extended families or their eldest sons were able to form new, informally operating communal councils as quickly as members of old ones were removed.[59]

Still, pointing to the weaknesses of a reformist political-economy strategy is not the same as demonstrating the effectiveness of a revolutionary sociocultural strategy as a means of creating a type of class-based society. To that end, I shall now

57. See Robert Pethybridge, *The Social Prelude to Stalinism* (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 196–242, for an acute appraisal of the shortcomings of Bukharin's reformist policy. In China, also prior to collectivization, there was a tendency for local cadres to withdraw from the Party, attempt to become local social-economic notables, and influence Party policy and organizations in pursuit of personal-social interests (see T. P. Bernstein, "Problems of Village Leadership after Land Reform," *China Quarterly* 36 [October–December 1968], esp. the section on the "threat from below," pp. 1–23). In this connection, see too Ilya Harik, "The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement: The Case of Egypt," *World Politics* 26, no. 1 (October 1973): 80–106, on the distinction between collaboration and mobilization movements.

58. Gregory Massell, *The Surrogate Proletariat* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 83.

59. Ibid.

examine collectivization in Romania, China, and the Soviet Union. This should allow me to scrutinize and develop my argument about Leninism's "ingenious error."

COLLECTIVIZATION

It would be erroneous to say that students of Leninist regimes have neglected collectivization. Especially in recent years, with the works of M. Lewin, Thomas Bernstein, James Millar, and others, collectivization has received a good deal of sophisticated attention.[60] However, it would not be erroneous to say that students of communist countries have given the greater part of their attention to industrialization, and that when collectivization has been studied, it has been from an economic- or political-control perspective.[61]

My thesis is twofold: collectivization may be the most distinctive feature of Leninist regime strategies, and its significance rests as much in its social as in its economic impact, and perhaps more. Expanding on this:

1. The neglect of the social dimensions of collectivization is extraordinary.
2. The distinctiveness of Leninist strategy may lie in collectivization as a particular means of undermining the peasant extended household and village—not so much as work units or social references, but rather as units and models of social, economic, and political power.
3. The effectiveness of collectivization as an attack on the status character of social organization is integrally related to a comprehensive policy of industrialization and education.
4. The collective farm may be viewed as a major instance of the neotraditional organization of Leninist regimes.

60. See M. Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968); James R. Millar, ed., *The Soviet Rural Community* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971); references to Bernstein's works have already been made.

61. See, for example, J. R. Millar and Alec Nove, "Was Stalin Really Necessary? A Debate on Collectivization," *Problems of Communism* 25, no. 4 (July–August 1976): 49–63. Nove's argument is the more insightful.

5. An argument about the significance of collectivization as a defining feature of Leninist strategy does not depend on every Leninist regime implementing collectivization with the same urgency or in the same fashion.

Fortunately, there are some studies of the social impact of collectivization that can be examined in terms of these arguments. I shall approach these studies with the following questions: Do they provide evidence that collectivization undermines the peasant-status quality of social and cultural life, favors the emergence of nuclear families and the individual over the peasant extended household, and not only supports but also entails the effective introduction of authoritative and superordinate impersonal norms of action and organization?

Several studies about the impact of collectivization have been undertaken in Romania. Without doubt the most valuable has been that of the Romanian rural sociologist Mihail Cernea, who emphasizes that in precommunist Romania, the family was the organizational matrix in both the social and economic realms. According to Cernea, commercialization and the consequent development of supra- and extra-familial associations did not remove the extended family as either the model of organization or as an integral component of socioeconomic (and political) organization and action.[62]

The centrality of the extended family household as the basic unit of identity and action in precommunist Romania also comes out quite clearly in Katherine Verdery's study of a Transylvanian village that had a German and Romanian population. She found that Germans and Romanians measured prestige in radically different ways. Germans "assessed one another's position by a set of ideas about individual character, capabilities, and personal traits. . . . Rich Germans whose character was found wanting were simply not esteemed." In contrast, the unit ranked by the Romanians was not the individual; it was the household.[63]

62. Mihail Cernea, *Sociologia cooperativa agricole de productie* [The sociology of collective farms] (Bucharest, 1974), pp. 420–58.

63. Katherine Verdery, "Ethnic Stratification in the European Periphery: The Historical Sociology of a Transylvanian Village" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1976), pp. 256–57.

How did collectivization affect this situation? Cernea argues that collectivization has created new types of organization, which are formal rather than social. It has removed "familialism" as the fundamental organizing principle of agricultural organization. The brigade and team replaced the peasant family as the basic work units. The brigade made the individual the core production unit and (to a greater or lesser extent) detached him or her from familial ties. At the same time, it subordinated the individual to nonfamilial hierarchies and authorities based on impersonal orientations. This substitution of formal organization based on impersonal norms and the individual for social organization based on personal norms and the extended household was reinforced by a new system of remuneration based on the individual's work day.[64] The brigade system, which operated for twenty years, can be seen as an assault on the status organization of the village and peasant extended household.

But how effective was the brigade system in Romania (or China and the Soviet Union?)—and what do we mean by effective? These questions are crucial in light of two phenomena: (a) in communist countries, the family's role as a locus of trust and a unit of mutual help and gain has in certain respects been reinforced;[65] and (b) in recent times, the extended family has reappeared as the basic work unit on some collective farms. The meaning of these two phenomena is by no means self-evident. "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose" may appeal to some as a conclusion about social change under Leninist auspices. It certainly does not tax one intellectually or, in many cases, ideologically. But "economical" as such a conclusion might be, it is extremely misleading.

The discovery by some observers that the extended family is still a prominent feature of the Romanian (and Chinese) landscape is important but somewhat superficial. As a corrective to notions that social change can be conceived of in absolute terms, it is useful, but that is the extent of its usefulness. The question is not whether the peasant extended patriarchal household has been completely eliminated, but whether it has maintained or lost its integrity as the institution providing personal identity, exercising social, economic, and political influence, and acting as the cultural model of authority and interpersonal relations.

64. Cernea, *Sociologia*, p. 199.

65. In response to periods of terror and provocation, the family became in some respects even more closely bound. In this connection, see A. Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 210–33, and H. Kent Geiger, *The Family in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pts. 3, 4, and 5.

To observe that the peasant extended household still functions is not nearly as important as knowing *how* it functions and in what setting. To establish the meaning and significance of the extended family's continued presence in communist countries like Romania and China, one must examine the present internal organization of the "extended" household, look at the political institutional context in which such a family operates, and identify the types of norms that effectively shape the behavior of its members. Viewed in this contextual light, John Cole's findings in Romania and William Parrish's in China have very different meanings from those the authors argue.

Cole's interesting discovery that the extended family still functions in the industrialized country of Brasov (Romania) does not present much of a challenge to my thesis that collectivization (*cum* industrialization and education) undermines the integrity of the peasant extended household.[66] Parrish has examined the impact of collectivization on the Chinese village. Among his conclusions are the following: the production team in the collective is "somewhat traditional / somewhat modern"; one of the reasons agricultural transformation was comparatively easy and rapid in the mid 1950s was that collectivization relied heavily on natural communities; there seem to have been shifts in social patterns in the countryside, which in some ways made certain types of villages more "encysted" than they were even twenty years before; new collectives and subsequent brigade and team units tended simply to enclose old villages and

66. John Cole, "Familial Dynamics in a Romanian Worker Village," *Dialectical Anthropology* 1, no. 3 (May 1976): 251–67. My critique of Cole's conclusions is balanced by my appreciation of the very valuable empirical work he and his students have done.

surname groups.[67] Evidently, there is not much support here for the recasting or transformatory power of Leninist collectivization. However, Parrish has more to say about the Chinese village since collectivization. It seems that "today there is less need to mobilize kinsmen outside the village simply because the cooperation of fellow villagers is guaranteed by the collective interest everyone has in the success of the year's harvest. To an extent . . . the narrow administrative circle has replaced the wider network of kinship."[68]

Since collectivization, the village may in certain respects be more self-contained, but not "encysted." Parrish's use of the terms *narrow* and *wider* misleads as much as informs. That village neighbors rather than kin from several villages now cooperate economically may well signify a dramatic shift and broadening of social organization. The "narrowness" of kin cooperation has been broadened to include "strangers"—in this case, village neighbors. In similar fashion, neighbors now marry inside the village rather than going outside, and villages have their own schools. What appears to Parrish to be a narrowing appears to me to be a broadening process, one that decompartmentalizes the status-kinship divisions in a corporate-familial society. Furthermore, that interactions between individuals at the higher commune level are more formal, impersonal, and limited in scope is not necessarily a weakness of the rural system. Insofar as this development entails the breakup of status-familial organization at the level of the "standard marketing area" without removing the family as a source of private solidarity or work at various levels, it may in fact be an element of strength.[69]

The decisive change in China, Romania, the Soviet Union, and other communist countries has been the imposition—in the rural as well as urban areas—of authoritative and effective frameworks of action and organization neither modeled after

67. See William L. Parrish, "China—Team, Brigade, or Commune?" *Problems of Communism* 25, no. 2 (March–April 1976): 51–66; also see the same author's "Socialism and the Chinese Peasant Family," *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 3 (May 1975): 613–30.

68. Parrish, "China—Team, Brigade, or Commune?" p. 54.

69. Insofar as a structurally multidimensional society is more adaptive than a society all of whose institutions and realms of social action are predicated on the same principle of orientation and organization.

nor based on the extended family. This does not mean status practices and orientations have been eliminated; it means they have effectively and regularly been subordinated to the regime's formal institutions and goals. The critical issue is not whether one can find instances of nepotism, corruption, and familialism in communist countries. It is whether these practices are informal responses in the context of authoritative institutions that limit their incidence and ensure to a great extent that they add to, rather than take away from, the regime's effective pursuit of its goals, or whether these practices are founded on largely intact status institutions that effectively compete with and subvert the operation of the regime's formal institutions and goals. To date, the difference between Leninist and "Third World" regimes is precisely in the greater success the former have had in subordinating status practices and orientations to the level of informal (not insignificant) behavior.[70]

To reiterate: the discovery of the continued existence of the extended family, the "narrowing" of the village, and corruption cannot uncritically be assumed to imply a lack of fundamental social change. One must ask: In what context do these practices and institutions exist, and consequently what systemic weight and character do they possess?

In his study of collectivization, Cernea notes the reappearance of the family as a strategic work unit on the collective farm. He goes on to ask the appropriate question: Does the reappearance of the family as the basic work unit on the collective farm mean the cooptation of the collective by the family? His answer is that the family unit has been incorporated at only one level of action—that of task execution. The system of *acord global,* one that recognizes the family as the contractual unit of work, utilizes "familialism" only where it proves functional—in work execution.[71] This functional recognition does not favor the reappearance of the (peasant) corporate patriarchal family as much as it favors an instrumentally oriented family made up of members with supplementary incomes and diverse careers,

70. This achievement is subject to developmental challenges, some of which Leninist regimes may be less successful in handling.

71. Cernea, *Sociologia,* pp. 208–9.

oriented as much to contracts as to connections, and to individual interests as to corporate ones.

In fact, the reappearance of the family as an important unit on the Romanian collective farm is possible in good measure precisely because of the prior developmental phase during which the peasant extended household and village were divested of their model and power qualities. The family that currently participates in the Romanian *acord global,* the Russian "link" system, and the Chinese production team is not the pre-collectivization family. Collectivization has not eliminated the family; rather, in conjunction with education, industrialization, and Party organization, it has recast the family's internal definition and its place in the social system. Leninist regimes have transformed their societies to the point where phenomena that once were public are now primarily private in standing and character. An example of this is Verdery's finding in the village collective she studied that former rich peasants and priests still receive more deference than either the Party secretary or the chairman of the collective.[72] But this deference has no direct political-economic significance. It is a private-social matter rather than (as in the past) an integral component and reflection of a particular type of sociopolitical order.

There is further evidence of institutional change in the Soviet case. Ian Hill, in his judicious and valuable examination of the ways in which the Russian rural population remains peasant, concludes with the following:

> Whilst, as I have indicated, certain groups still retain economic, social, and cultural peasant characteristics, in view of the depth and extent of cultural change it seems doubtful whether these characteristics are sufficient for us to continue applying the term peasant to members of the rural population. . . . The bulk of the rural population have learned to act within the confines of socialized agriculture and it seems that their peasant characteristics are a small element in their total cultural and behavioural makeup.[73]

72. Verdery, "Ethnic Stratification," pp. 271 and 277.
73. Ian H. Hill, "The End of the Russian Peasantry? The Social Structure and Culture of the Contemporary Soviet Agricultural Population," *Soviet Studies* 27, no. 1 (January 1975): 127.

Through the effective imposition of institutions (e.g., collective farms) that are neither modeled nor based primarily on personal norms of action and organization, and through the effective introduction of industrial and education policies, Leninist regimes have, to varying extents, successfully created societies that allow greater social mobility for the individual and resource mobility for the regime. They have created a neocorporate variant of class society, a charismatic "substitute" for the procedural type of class society that developed in the West.

"FAMILIALISM" IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Though not to be understood as the persistence of the peasant corporate family, "familialism" may indeed be a current issue for Leninist regimes. There may well be new forms of "familialism" in communist countries, related to the routinization of the Party and the rationalization of society.

As I stressed earlier, the auspices of social change shape the organization and meaning of change. To use a familiar example, the West did not simply experience industrialism and national development. Entrepreneurial capitalism and feudalism have given a particular cast to the pattern of economic, social, and political development in the West.

In communist countries, a charismatic political organization acting as the purposive and dominant agent of change has generated a neotraditional ethos and institutional pattern at both the social and regime levels. In communist countries, status organization has not given way to the individual entrepreneur and citizen acting in market and public arenas. It has given way to a comprehensive set of neocorporate institutions (e.g., unity fronts, official unions, collective farms) with official-political status. The deliberate preemption by the Party of any potential political arena or role not coterminous with its own organization and membership—that is, its collapsing of the official and political realms—more than anything else determines the character of sociopolitical developments and the manner in which sociopolitical conflicts in communist countries are manifested and resolved.

At the regime level, the collapsing of the official and political realms favors Party familialization—that is, the routinization of a charismatic organization in a traditional direction.[74] This tendency is not unprecedented in Leninist regimes. The "new class" phenomenon has been observed over and over again. The difference today is the absence of a secret police–permanent purge mechanism able to ensure that the Party-apparatchik monopoly of political power does not become the monopoly of certain families who are in the Party.

Viewed in this light, Khrushchev's attempts at educational reforms can be seen more as attacks on the development of a ruling class of cadre families than as attacks on the development of a ruling class of Party cadres.[75] Certainly, Susan Shirk's study of Chinese middle schools suggests that the children of cadres have many of the attitudes and styles one associates with an established elite of interconnected families, convinced of their "right to rule" and basing that conviction on ascriptive characteristics such as family origin and official position more than on achievement considerations.[76] In Romania, recent criticisms of Party cadres acting as baptismal sponsors in return for deference and material goods, as patrons of clients engaged in semilegal and illegal business transactions (*nasul afaceristilor*), and as sponsors of (often unqualified) aspirants to Party or governmental offices point in the same direction.[77] Intermarriage at the Party elite level, "closing off" mobility at certain levels to nonelite families, and the development of a "right to rule" mentality within elite families (both Party and Party-connected) are phenomena that warrant empirical investigation in light of my conjecture about the direction Party traditionalization may be taking.

74. For Max Weber's comments on the traditionalization of charisma, see Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1:246–54.

75. See Jeremy Azrael, "Soviet Union," in *Education and Political Development*, ed. James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 233–72.

76. Susan L. Shirk, "Schoolcraft in China: Political Culture as Strategic Behavior" (manuscript, 1977). I am most grateful to Professor Shirk for having sent me her article before its publication.

77. See *Scînteia* (Bucharest) September 24, 1977, pp. 2–3.

The tendency toward "Party familialization" at the regime level has a counterpart at the social level. There also one encounters a phenomenon that can be approached in terms of a "familialism" different in character from what existed prior to the developmental efforts of Leninist regimes.[78] The efforts have succeeded noticeably in changing the occupational and educational profiles of communist countries. One striking manifestation is the emergence of a broad stratum oriented to achievement norms, calculable rules, and the nuclear family as the locus of affection and individual effort. However, the ethos and orientation of this stratum has a distinctive cast, one that often escapes those whose major interest is changes in social stratification. This ethos and orientation may be seen as a defensive response to the preemption of public political life by the Party-official stratum.

What one finds in communist countries today in some ways fits as well as any nineteenth-century Western example the picture of bourgeois society Marx drew in "On the Jewish Question."[79] One can point to a growing stratum of families whose achievement orientations and emphasis on individual effort and responsibility are suffused with an overriding concern with private life, private gain, self-interest, and career advancement. The political manifestation of this "selfish" individualism is the highly instrumental conception of regime legitimacy one finds within this stratum.[80] If we define as legitimate a regime able to assume the voluntary provision of private resources for official or public purposes, then in basic (not all) respects, regimes in communist countries are not very legitimate.[81] In some respects, Edward Banfield's image of peasant amoral society can

78. By "developmental efforts," I mean the collectivization, industrialization, and educational efforts of the Party.

79. Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 24–52.

80. This observation is based on the author's experience and the observations of other students of Leninist regimes. Unfortunately, it does not have the support of survey data that would provide a more disaggregated and differentiated picture of political attitudes in these societies.

81. This statement should not preclude an appreciation of the extent to which a given regime's legitimacy varies over time and with respect to different facets of national life—e.g., participation, national defense capacity, or social welfare measures.

be transferred to communist countries under the label of urban amoral society.[82]

Ironically, the tendency at the regime level toward routinization of a Party based on charismatic impersonalism into a syncretic organizational-familial status group has been paralleled at the social level by the relative demise of status and the crystallization of a type of class orientation and family organization.

To be sure, this brief discussion of "familialism" at the regime and social levels in communist countries is speculative and schematic—and deliberately so. The motive is to identify those sociopolitical tendencies likely to define the field within which all politically conflictual forces in these countries interact. Among these forces, one should include the following: (1) the continued existence in Leninist regimes of leadership cadres committed to a conception of the Party as an impersonal-heroic organization and opposed to its routinization into a syncretic organizational-familial status group; (2) the widespread existence and persistence of statuslike attitudes among the peasantry, working class, the professional strata concerned with (job) security and maintenance of personal connections with those of elite status; and (3) the pressure on these regimes to respond positively to classlike developments in their own orders—pressures that come from increasing ties with Western economies and societies and that probably support those sectors within Leninist regimes more oriented to class than status or charismatic modes of action and organization.

An identification of contrasting regime and social developments is not a sufficient base for deducing the timing or specific content of particular crises, however. Nor can one deduce from a conceptual statement of this order—one that attempts synthetically to portray the distinctive quality of Leninist sociopolitical organization and analytically to identify the basic conflict points in that organization—the inevitability of political "degeneration" or cataclysm. To deal with the timing and content of crises, the formulations offered here must be complemented by empirical studies of particular Leninist regimes.

82. Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958), passim.

My effort in this essay has had a different purpose. I have tried conceptually to specify the novelty of Leninism as political organization and strategy. I have proceeded on the assumption that the meaning of organization, strategy, and conflict in communist countries is not self-evident and that an adequate understanding of the developmental history and institutional profile of these regimes depends on more adequate conceptualization. Nowhere is this need more evident than in the relation between the national and international development of Leninist regimes.

COMBINED SUBSTITUTION

My analysis of Leninism as a particular response to the status organization of peasant society and the related phenomenon of dependency has been primarily national in focus.[83] The value of such a perspective, even if not fully realized in this essay, justifies such a study. However, simple observation strongly suggests that a historical and organizational phenomenon like the Soviet bloc was an integral—not marginal—part of the Leninist "response." For practically all Leninist regimes, dependence on the Soviet Union has been a defining feature of their developmental efforts for a greater or lesser part of their existence. The implication is that any attempt to specify the distinctiveness of Leninism as a response to the status organization of peasant society and dependency must include and explain the relationship between national and international levels of action and organization. I shall attempt to do so in this chapter.

In addressing this task, I shall introduce the notion of "combined substitution"—a concept that speaks both to the distinctiveness of Leninism as a national/international response to dependency and to the general need for concepts that systematically relate the national and international dimensions of sociopolitical change.

So far, three features of Leninism as a novel and effective (if

83. I address the "fit" between the internal ordering of a status society and the organization of international relations in "The Sociocultural Bases of Natural Dependency in Peasant Countries," in *Social Change in Romania, 1860–1940*, ed. Ken Jowitt (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978), pp. 1–30.

not highly efficient or legitimate)[84] mode of social change in a peasant country have been identified: the substitution of charismatic for procedural impersonalism; the recasting of status and the development of class features under charismatic organizational auspices; and Leninism's "ingenious error" of analysis, with an accompanying emphasis on institutional, not just elite, transformation of the agrarian sector.

A glance at the international position of most communist countries—at least during their initial phases of development—appears to complicate this view seriously, however. For a country like Romania (and in this case Romania typifies the greater number of Leninist regimes), one might argue that under the auspices of this novel Leninist organization, it simply shifted its "neocolonial" referent from France (or Germany) to the Soviet Union. In fact, *neocolonial* is too charitable a term. For more than a decade, most communist countries were more colonies than neocolonies of the Soviet Union. The presence of Soviet troops, advisers, and secret police officials; economic plans establishing the priority of Soviet interests; and the imposition of Soviet political and economic models meant direct Soviet domination, with a significant impact on a whole range of immediate- and long-term conflicts, from intra- and inter-Party conflicts to issues of national legitimacy for each of these regimes. Important as this dimension of Soviet colonialism is, however, it in no way exhausts its significance, for in a major respect, Soviet colonialism under Stalin was "colonialism of a new type."

For approximately a decade, the organization of the Soviet bloc was strictly analogous to the organization of a Leninist party. The relationship between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and non-Soviet ruling parties was based on status and class features recast and shaped by charismatic impersonalism. As for status features, just as a Leninist party is based on the neotraditional insider-outsider distinction, so under the aegis of the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc was a political

84. To be useful, the notions of "efficient" and "legitimate" must be related to the central ideological and situational features of an elite and society that are involved in a revolutionary process. I have made some observations on the issue of legitimacy in a revolutionary situation in Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development*, pp. 115–20.

entity of insiders versus outsiders. Just as each local Party provided some sense of security for its members, so the Soviet regime provided political and military security for each of its member regimes.[85] Just as each party was led by a figure readily intelligible in traditional terms (i.e., Mao Tse-tung, Tito, Gheorghiu-Dej, Ho Chi Minh), so the regime bloc was led by a "big man," Stalin, a leader whose heroic feats—collectivization, industrialization, and defeat of the Nazis—created awe and inspired the conviction that "socialism in one country" could be generalized outside the Soviet setting.

This conviction was underwritten by Soviet insistence that each Leninist regime could and must replicate the Soviet industrial-rural breakthrough. As David Granick and, even more so, Paul Shoup have argued, this insistence that the "colonies" engage in rapid and comprehensive industrialization and rural transformation was a unique form of colonialism.[86] This colonialism insisted on the creation of engineers and agronomists, the building of factories and heavy industry, and the creation of an educational network and opportunities for social mobility on a scale that no other modern form of colonialism has come close to matching. These priorities reflected the class-order commitments and goals of each Leninist regime and the superordinate Soviet regime. That they were conceived of and organized as a rapid, intense, and often irrational assault was due to the heroic-charismatic ethos and orientation of those regimes.[87] The bloc was organized in the same terms and fashion as individual Leninist parties, but it was an international unit, and as

85. Furthermore, within the bloc, as within each party, security was threatened by the leadership's peremptory-arbitrary actions (i.e., purges)—in the former by the Soviet leadership, in the latter by the leadership of each party vis-à-vis its internal membership.

86. See David Granick, "The Pattern of Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe and Its Relation to Economic Development Policy," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 68, no. 3 (August 1954): 377–401, and Paul Shoup, "Communism, Nationalism, and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations after World War II," *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 4 (December 1962): 886–98.

87. One must be careful not to confuse the popular use of the terms *hero* and *heroism* with the concept of heroism. The former imply something good, a positively valued individual or action. The latter refers to a distinguishable type of behavior in which risk, prowess, and disdain for a rational calculus of cost and benefits are defining (though not the only) features.

such it added a crucial dimension to the efforts of its individual members to break through a "neocolonial" dependency pattern.

To break through dependency in a peasant country, a political organization with a paradigm antithetical to that of a social order based on status must simultaneously insulate itself from and recast the institutions of a peasant society AND insulate the country itself from international ties that constrain, shape, and reinforce domestic institutional patterns.

I call the dual process of insulation-transformation at the national/international level *combined substitution.*[88] The Soviet bloc in its initial phases is one historical instance of this phenomenon. Under the aegis of the Soviet Union, the bloc acted as an international organizational substitute for the international membership and reference groupings that shaped elite self-conceptions in these countries before Leninist parties took power. While the local parties substituted domestically for the social elites and institutions of a peasant-status society, the Soviet regime provided them with the models, resources, resolution, and "space" to act on their shared programmatic-ideological commitments.

There are a number of things to be said about Leninism as a

88. *Combined substitution* is an ideal-typical construct. Applied to the Soviet bloc phenomenon, it selects and emphasizes the distinctive ideological and strategic tendencies and actions of Leninist elites organized in a particular national and international fashion. It is not an inexorable law, familiarity with which allows an analyst to ignore the level of contingent political action. The analyst must operate at two levels in order to explain particular developments. For example, the fact that in 1948 the Soviet Union called for the implementation of social transformation in Eastern Europe should not be seen as an automatic consequence of its ideological commitments and organizational character, but rather as the coincidence of those two elements and the definition of its political interests in a particular set of environments (domestic, regional, international). In a quite different setting, Outer Mongolia, social transformations were in good part put off by the Soviet Union for some thirty years; insulation was achieved, but transformation was in many respects delayed. The reasons for the delay are to be found at the level of political contingency—in this case, the Soviet Union's absorption in the 1930s with its own social transformation and its concern over the role of Japan in Northeast Asia. The critical link between the level of politically contingent actions and ideological-organizational imperatives is an elite's definition of political interests. Presumably such definitions reflect ideological-organizational constants and environmental variables.

historical-organizational instance of combined substitution. First, we must come to grips with a fundamental distinction in the field of communist studies between independent and "derivative" regimes. This distinction between regimes such as the Chinese and Bulgarian or Yugoslav and Romanian is accurate and useful—but not equally so for all questions.

Although different countries and parties have had significantly different ties with the Soviet Union, and these ties have changed significantly over time,[89] even independent regimes like the Chinese, Yugoslav, and Vietnamese have recognized an ideological, military, and/or organizational debt to the Soviet Union in their initial efforts to establish a new domestic and international position.[90] This observation should be seen as an addition, not an alternative, to the independent-derivative formulation. The conclusion to be drawn is that even the relationship between the independent regimes and the Soviet Union has been in certain important respects and at particular times closer than the typical relationship between even allied sovereign states.

Second, there would appear to be a rather glaring anomaly to my argument that combined substitution is a necessary condition for avoiding or terminating a dependent domestic/international pattern. That anomaly is the Soviet case itself. The Soviet Union developed without the aid of a "bloc" substitute acting at the international level. Furthermore, of course, there are striking instances of non-Leninist countries avoiding dependency. In the nineteenth century, Japan and the United States provide two examples, as does Israel in the twentieth. All three underline a very important point—namely, although the Soviet bloc postwar pattern is an extremely important historical

89. I have tried to identify these changes in three works: "The Romanian Communist Party and the World Socialist System: A Redefinition of Unity," *World Politics* 23, no. 1 (October 1970): 38–61; "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Systems," *World Politics* 28, no. 1 (October 1975): 69–97 (see chapter 3); and *Images of Détente and the Soviet Political Order* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1977).

90. At later dates, these and other Leninist regimes have emphasized the negative contributions of the Soviet regime and their own "self-reliance"; while significant for the analyst, such declarations should not be viewed uncritically.

instance of combined substitution, it should not be confused with the concept itself.

The exhaustion of the western nations after World War I, the potential within the Soviet Union to build "socialism in one country," and the initial and sustaining faith in revolutionary support from western Europe are the components of the Soviet pattern of combined substitution. In the American case, the de facto international insulation provided by the British Navy and the absence of a peasantry domestically constituted another instance of combined substitution. I am not familiar with the Japanese case, but surely the role of the British Empire in the nineteenth century and the peculiar social-organizational domestic order that Chie Nakane has so insightfully described were central to Japan's avoidance of dependency.[91] What distinguishes the Soviet bloc pattern (not to be confused with the Soviet case per se) as an instance of combined substitution is that a set of regimes transformed their domestic social order and international position under the deliberate organizational auspices of a great power with which they shared an ideological affinity.

As already suggested, the particular Soviet bloc pattern of combined substitution is not the only one that has historically "worked." But it is worth noting that the domestic and international situation of most contemporary "Third World" peasant countries attempting to create sovereign national and modern social orders is closer to that of prewar Romania or Bulgaria than to the United States or Japan in the nineteenth century or the Soviet Union or Israel in the twentieth. Regardless of what similarities there may be, however, the particular Leninist pattern of combined substitution that was applied to the postwar period is no longer available to most of the "Third World" for the following reasons. First, there is no single leader in the Soviet bloc able to elicit the kind of awe and exercise the kind of power/authority that Stalin could. Second, Soviet Leninism, which after World War I was viewed by some activists in the colonies as revolutionary and liberating, is now seen by many as the conservative system of a powerful and potentially

91. Nakane, *Japanese Society*.

threatening state—the Soviet Union. Third, the emphasis (misplaced to an extent, if this analysis is correct) contemporary "Third World" regimes place on national "self-reliance" works against the creation of a bloc comparable to the Soviet postwar phenomenon.

For all these reasons, I suggest that Leninism is best seen as a historical as well as organizational syndrome, consisting of a political organization based on charismatic impersonalism; a strategy based on an "ingenious error" leading to collectivization-industrialization; and an international bloc led by a dominant regime, with the same definition as its constituent parts, acting as leader, model, and support. In this light, the Cuban revolution and Cuba's relationship to the Soviet Union are watersheds calling for careful examination and formulation.

One of the more intriguing questions of the latter part of the twentieth century is whether new combined substitution patterns of national development will emerge in the "Third World" or elsewhere.

New World Disorder

The Leninist Extinction

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